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I~TRODUCTIOX
The extremely rapid rate of growth in international economic
activity in the past 20 years is deserving of special attention,
practically and theoretically, by anthropologists no less than
by economists and political scientists.
,4,.ftercenturies of only gradual inclination, the volume of international trade in manufactured goods among the industrial
countries tripled in the 20 years preceding 1975. Some of the
reasons for this are obvious: technological improvements in
transportation, communication, manufacturing, packaging, and
so forth. Others are less obvious, but widely appreciated: increase in the number of nations, relaxation of governmental restraints on trade between nations, and worldwide growth in
demand for goods. Most interesting among the factors making
1This paper is an expandedversion of a paper originally presented
at the 141st annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,New York, January 1975,as part of the symposium "The Mode of Production: Method and Theory." I wish to
expressgratitude to James M. Silverberg, the organizer of that symposium, whose interest in my earlier studies of the supranationally
organized mining industry stimulated me to review this fertile field
of scholarship. I owe also a debt of gratitude to Mary Gray Rust,
whoseresearchassistancemadepossiblethe writing of the symposium
paper, and to Gilbert Kushner, who made helpful comments on the
manuscript.
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for the sudden quantum leap in international trade statistics,
however, is the complex of organizational events and patterns
that has been called "the internationalization of production."
Central to this complex is the development of a new type of
economic unit, the multinational enterprise. Vernon (1972:8)
sees it like this:
The multinational provides a striking illustration of the extent to
which modem meansof communication permit an integrated organization to link resources in different national economies in order to
serve a common set of organizational aims. The term "multinational
enterprise" is sometimes confusing and always imprecise; but what
I have in mind here is simply a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive
to a common management strategy. That kind of definition serves
well enough to characterize Ford or Nestle, IBM or Philips.
Nothing is altogether without precedent in human institutionbuilding; but the multinational enterprise, as I use the term here,
comes very close to lacking a relevant precedent.
What is most significant is not merely that trade has increased,
but rather that production is being organized on a worldwide
scale. What we see is not simply trade between separate buyers
and sellers at arm's length in an open market, but rather an
organization of the factors of production among sets of enterprises that operate in several nation-states.
The changing system we are experiencing is better revealed
in data on investment than in those on trade. Unfortunately,
statistics on in~ern~~ional phepo~e~~-ar-~ t~often
rough approximationS.Polk
(1972) estimates that foreign investment
and production activities in the noncommunist countries
amount to $450 billion in value. Almost one-sixth of the aggregate world production has come to be organized multinationally, and the multinationally
organized production is growing
more rapidly than the aggregate. As Polk says (p. 74), "I think
it may be accepted that at this level of relative importance
internationalized activities suggest not just a special area of
overlap among national economies but rather the solid underpinning of an emergent world economy."
In support of my contention that these phenomena are dynamic, not merely massive, I would point out that U.S. direct
investment in foreign countries, only $11.8 billion in 1950, increased almost tenfold by 1973, to $107.3 billion (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1975:799). The World Bank Annual Report for
1976 shows that the private resource flow (investment) into
developing countries increased from $3 billion in 1960 to $21 bil615

lion in 1975. .,\ laTge part of this is due to productive
enterprise
organized
multi nationally
in the natural-re50Urce
industries
(fuels and minerals).
In the early 1960s my studies of the problem;; of new African
states in central and southern Africa led me to appreciate
the
importance of multinational
enterprises in the mining and metals industries-not
so much in their individual
actions as in
their systematic organization
at a supranational
level. As I reported then (1963:153-54),
I found the mineral extraction industry of southern Africa to be organized in an intricate social system based more on overlapping membership of a variety of groups than on a bureaucratic centralization
of administrative power. The network binds groups that are different
both structurally and functionally, some business corporations, some
states, some families, in a modern supranational structure that is
more than just international. ...The
several hundred mining companies operating in southern Africa are integrated through a series
of relationships that focus on some of the larger among them. ...
Then, in a variety of ways, these corporations are linked \vith governments.
A consequence of the operation of this system is that raw materials for the world's industrial
plants are produced-natural
resources are discovered, their exploitation
managed, the ores
treated and shipped to Europe and America, downstream,
so to
speak, in the production
process. Kationality
is not an issue,
for "the corporations
of this group are registered in many different states, and are owned and directed by persons of diverse
nationalities.
...The
supranational
integration
in the economic sphere tends more and more to supersede the political,
international,
ties and cleavages" (\\'olfe 1963:164). This whole
seemed to me to have a structure more like the tribal structure
of the Aranda of Australia,
where ties of local community,
marriage class, and totemic group intertwine
knit social fabric (Spencer and Gillen
Tallensi of Ghana, where counterpoised

to maintain a tightly
1927), or that of the
ties and cleavages re-

quire complementary
action of different
kinds of "chiefs"
to
"prosper
the land"
(Fortes 1940), than like anything
social
scientists have so far described in the Western tradition.
Because the system as a whole is above the level or the nationstate and is not merely an international
or interstate
political
subsystem, I decided to treat it as a new system at a supranational level or integratian-something
still in the process of
developing, an emergent concomitant
with intensive industrialization or the world. Minerals are to this system what food is
to a local community.

THEORETICAL
BASES FOR UNDERSTANDING
THE SUPRANATIONAL
SYSTEM
In the early 1960s,I was almost alone in looking into the development of a supranational sociocultural system. Scholars interested in economic and political development at that time
were focusing on the development of nation-states or of regional
blocks of nations. Since 1965, however, the subject has been intensively studied by representatives of several disciplines;
among the numerous widely publicized books on the subject
are those of Apter and Goodman (1976), Ball (1975), Barnet
and Muller (1974), Gilpin (1975), Jacoby (1973), Kapoor and
Boddewyn (1973), Kapoor and Grub (1972), Kolde (1974),
Modelski (1974), Paquet (1972), Said and Simmons (1975),
Tugendhat (1971), Turner (1973), Vernon (1971, 1972), Widstrand \1975), and Wilkins (1974). Still, these studies fail to
provide the holistic frame of reference I feel is needed.
International i:ra:d,e~theory, based is It is 'on the concept of
territorial uriitS;"couf1tries;'~
"
, , " seemsin&aequlit'ifor
."",
, " ;0" ",underStandc
'ing the suprariational developments 9f recent aecades; Similarly,
~heeconomic1heo"" of oligoPoly 'Seelrts1oJtave' no"explanatory
or predIctive Pow~"M~rXist'inteIPretaiions'c
be interesting-theoretically,
,

616

because a new supranational

level of integra-

tion seems to be emerging regardless of the modes of production
thus integrated, and empirically, because socialist and communist governments are now to some extent participating in the
supranational system through contractual agreements with
"private" multinational companies and through joint ventures
\\"ith capitalist companies. I have not been able to find a Marxist work \\"hich treats the supranational system as anything
more than an imperialistic continuation of the gro\\"th of nationally based monopoly capitalism. Although he has much
more to say than this quotation implies, Magdoff (1976:216)
tends to shrug off the recent growth of multinational corporations as "merely the latest emanation of the restless accumulation of capital and the innate drift towards greater concentration and centralization of capital." An interesting discussion of
some of these matters is found in Horo\vitz (1975), but even
there one finds almost no direct reference to writings by representatives of a firm Marxist position. Another comment on
Marxism and multinationals is found in Yon Krosigk (1972).
A few international-organization
scholars (Galtung 1968) or
students of "international management" (Gallo\\.ay 1971) approach the problem from an appropriately broad perspective,
though I do not believe their theories are yet adequate.
A theoretical approach that promises to provide an adequate
frame of reference for study of the internationalization
of production is a sociocultural evolutionary one such as that for
\\.hich the essential components are proposed by Ste\\.ard (1955).
His systematic model-usually referred to as "multilinear evolution" or "cultural ecology," although neither title suggests
the elements that give the theory privileged status here-includes prominently the conception of "qualitatively
distinctive
organizational systems at hierarchically ordered levels of integration." A common use of part of what Steward had in mind
is the ordering of societies according to the highest level or organiiational system each has evidenced-for
example, band
societies, tribal societies, chiefdoms, nation-states. There is,
however, a deeper meaning in Ste\vard's model that is important to an understanding of the processes of evolution.
"In culture," Steward (1955:55) writes, "simple forms, such
as those represented by the family or band, do not wholly disappear when a more complex stage of development is reached,
nor do they merely survive fossil-like ...they
gradually become modified as specialized, dependent parts of new kinds of
total configurations." Thus, any sociocultural system is composed of parts that must themselves be seen as subsystems of
varying degrees of mutual interdependency-the
subsystems
differentially autonomous and dependent with respect to other
subsystems as well as with respect to the whole. Seen this way,
the generative process by which a new system, qualitatively
distinctive, at a hierarchically superior level of integration,
comes into being can be appreciated. Previously existing units
and subunits, in the course of adjustment and adaptation,
change their relations with one another and sometimes "integrate" to a point where a new unit or subunit is recognized.
(For example, by actions, interactions, and transactions of
certain kinds that we come to label acts of incorporation, new
corporations are formed.) Previously existing units or subunits
change their internal structure so that we recognize new units
or subunits generated by fission or a hiving-off process. (By
the normal developmental cycle of domestic group-s, new households are created; by decolonization, new nation-states are
created.) At some point-gradually
approached, without doubt,
but sometimes dramatically reached-all the internal and external relations of units and subunits are different enough from
what they were previously and dependent enough on some system of wider scale that a new system at a higher le;Ye)of integration has been generated.
: .,:,;
"'It ':'. :,:;
It is important to appreciate that a: Dew ~s~emat a higher
level of integratioriis, according t~~h.e theor.eti~l,~pproa:c~
adopted here, really new and qualttatlvely dIfferent. In thIs
paper, our attention is att~ct,ed to a cultural-ecologica! system
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that is above the level of nation-gtate and above the level of the
multinatioruu firm and even the multinational enterprise as
Vernon defines it. The system of our concern is different from
an international organization and different from a cartel formed
by corporations. All these lesser organizationg are involved, as
subsystems, in a wider system, and some of them are adapting
as the control of the wider system comes to be felt. States and
firms are to the emerging supranational system what tissues
and organs are to a biological organism. It is this emerging higher level that is problematic, and it is elusive because we do not
yet have a frame of reference in which to conceptualize it.
Grobstein (1973:74) addresses this sort of problem: "Formal
analysis [of living systems characterized by hierarchical order]
shows that emergence relates to what may be called set-superset
transitions. In these, determinate association of components
provides new collective sets \vith relationally transformed information not resident in individual components. The new information frequently can be read only in a context or frame provided by another, often also ne\vly formed, level of order."
Most attempts to understand the increasing internationalization of economic activity suffer the defect that they have not
sufficiently taken into account that a genuinely new level of
integration is being achieved. I find this failing not only in economics, political science, and management, but even, surprisingIy, in anthropological studies that show an a\\.areness of something developing above the nation-state. For example, both
Adams (1975) and Belsha\v (1976) seem to presume, contrary
to my view, that state-type institutions still provide the most
likely model for understanding future human organization of
wider scale.
We are faced with hierarchically ordered subsystems and systems, not necessarily with a succession of mutually exclusive
systems that can be differentiated by reference to accumulation
of traits. Sometimes the previously existing units are changed
completely out of existence (perhaps that happened to chiefdoms and to some segmentary acephalous societies) as the system at the higher level develops. Sometimes, however, as
Ste\vard points out, they continue in modified form as interdependent parts of new configurations (as households have
adapted to a variety of relevant larger systems and as local
communities have taken different forms in different kinds of
societies).
In this sociocultural evolutionary perspective, organization,
the set of relationships among units, is seen as intrinsically
dynamic and not merely as an indicator of technological development, productive potential, energy transformation, or i>opulation size. The creation of a new system is a matter of complex
changes in the forms and relationships of many subsystems and
is only indirectly connected with technoenvironmental phenomena.
This sociocultural evolutionary conception provides us with
a time perspective that may be more appropriate to the problem
of the development of a supranational system than the time
perspective associated with other theoretical approaches to the
problem. First, there is the macroscale, which helps us see
whatever changes are going on now (momentous times, to us
as citizens) as but phases of a process that has continued for,
not hundreds or thousands, but hundreds of thousands of years.
We need the humility that macroscale provides to acquire some
objectivity. What we see as vital new creations of the 1950s are,
in one sense, only overgrown versions of the business corporations invented centuries ago, and the states whose futures we
are wondering about now are only modifications of those invented a few thousand years ago. Second, while political philosophers and economists frequently work in an abstract, timeless
world wherein current conditions appear to be expressions of
eternal verities-the State, the Market-the
anthropological perspective is empirically grounded, always ready to admit variation, seeing nothing as eternal. We know that sociocultural evolution has been proceeding at an increasingly rapid rate. We
Vol.18
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need the sense of urgency that exponential scale suggests to us,
for it motivates us to seek solutions.
If the sociocultural evolutionary model entails a dialectic between time on a macroscale and time on a log scale because of
its empirical basis in historic fact, it also entails, for the same
reason, an appreciation of the significance of variation in rates
of change. In evolution, it would appear that changes in relationships cumulate at an increasing rate up to a critical point
at which the new system exerts some control-evidenced
in a
decrease in rate of change in those relationships-for
a time.
Right no\v, many changes in relations among units relevant to
the international scene are occurring almost simultaneously. I
do not say that our theoretical model deals adequately with
time, but only that it recognizes the complexity of time as a
property at different levels of an evolving hierarchical system.
Significant steps toward understanding some of this complexity
are found in Pattee (1973) and Hamblin, Jacobsen, and Miller
(1973).

EMERGENCE
OF A NOVEL
OF PRODUCTION

ORGANIZATIO~

Among the cumulating changes contributing to the generation
of a qualitatively distinctive sociocultural system at a higher
level of integration are changes in the organization of production. These include modifications relative to factors of production, transactions, and corporateness.
Changes in the technical aspects of production require reinterpretation of the technical factors of production. Obviously,
land, labor, and capital are simply inadequate categories for
dealing \vith modern production problems. At the least, we must
now make finer differentiations so as to take account of technical
information, managerial information, system information, and
organizational setting, each of which is a measurable quantity
of something bearing directly on production (Behrman 1972,
Robinson 1972). Also, the complexity of modem productive
systems and sociocultural systems makes even more critical an
appreciation of the distinction between the technical factors
of production and the "transactional factors," a term used by
Dowling (1974) in reference to "the people who O\\-n and sell"
those technical factors. The social relationships whose changes I
see as involved in evolutionary systemic change affect and are
expressed in transactional factors. Obviously, the mix of the
technical factors has been changing markedly to\\"ard capitalintensive production. The effective concomitant of this shift is
in the social control of the factors.
The mechanisms of control of factors of production are complicated, clearly requiring more refined categorization than
shareholders and managers of corporations, citizens and officials
of states, common and skilled workers, technicians and bureaucrats. In fact, mechanisms of control have become so complicated that proper analysis must take into account the truth that
people as such, as human organisms, are not the only social units
which make decisions as to allocation and disposition. On the
one hand, corporations (which used to be mere fictions) have
taken on the status of real social units and must be counted
among the actors at various levels of the total system (Galtung
1968). On the other hand, the complexity of relations in production is such that control is never absolute, in consequence of
which analysis must take into account the networks of shared
and conflicting interests. This last means that the concepts of
"ownership" and "property"
can no longer be used without
qualification and that the ownership or control of a resource
may realistically be said to be held by an imperfectly bounded
network set, not by a person or a corporate group of persons.
Ailof these phenomena can be illustrated by reference to the
organization of production in the natural-resource industriest\17

mining (e,g" \\.olfc 1963) or oil (c.g" Mikesell ct al. 1971, Pcnrose 1968)-but thcy can be obscrved in all walks of life. In
fact, they arc not in thcmsel\.es utterly new, but technical and
theorctical developments both in the industries involved and
in our acadcmic disciplincs have made it not only dcsirable, but
also possible, to take them into account. For example, multivariate analysis makes it possible for our modcls to be closer to
reality; graph theory makes it possible to deal more adequately
\vith the myriad data involved in a network. Computers and
system-simulation models make it possible for corporations to
systematize their production on a world scale jointly and rationally; by the same token, social analysts are now able to
examine the new systems thus generated.
The kinds of relations that exist among the technical factors
of production are customarily viewed as determined by inputoutput analysis in the context of a free market. Thus, the "owners" use their control to maximize their gain in return for giving
up some quantity of a resource. Acco'rding to this model, transactions are all in one mode, governed by the market principle
or by a rationality rule according to which giving is contingent
only upon anticipated return. Despite assumptions that are
obviously and glaringly not satisfied in the real world, this kind
of analysis has served fairly \\.ell in helping to account for the
events of industrialization in the past.
The modern system of production involves many transactions
and decisions that are not in this mode, either because the actors are not the kind of units for \vhich the market model ,,.as
constructed, or because the conditions are not right for the price
mechanism to operate as predicted, or because different actors
have quite different definitions of resources or terms, or because
all things of value are not in the same transactional sphere. In
brief, not one but several modes of transaction and spheres of
transaction are relevant to the modern system of production,
and our anthropological conception of distinctive sociocultural
systems at hierarchically ordered levels of integration permits
such complexities to be take!l into account.
Since Bohannan and Dalton (1962) brought Karl Polanyi's
\\"ritings forcefully to the attention of anthropologists, his original notions of three forms of economic integration (reciprocal,
redistributive, and market systems) have undergone considerable refinement. Anthropologists now tend to see most economic systems as multicentric (consisting of more than one
sphere) and the several transactional spheres as often characterized by the dominance of different transactional modes
(Barth 1966, Firth 1967). Meeker (1971) has differentiated six
alternative decision rules governing transactions (comparable
to my modes) : rationality, altruism, group-gain, competition,
status consistency, and reciprocity. Although one may not
want to go so far as six, any model of a transactional system that
would approximate reality must recognize minimally two modes
or decision rules: maximization, according to which giving is
contingent upon anticipated return, and another, for which
some use the term "reciprocity" but for which I prefer the term
"antiminimization,"
according to which giving is contingent
upon assessment of another'~ needs or wants (if for no other
reason than to keep the other party in the game or system).
These two modes are not mutually exclusive, yet in many situations, and in some entire spheres, one or the other will predominate.
The first principle, maximization, needs no illustration;
we are all familiar with arm's-length market transactions in
which each party seeks maximum gain. Corporations and persons as well are.usually, perhaps always in some degree, trying
to get as much as they can while gi,:,ing as J.ittle. The second
princip!,e, h<1:!.~e!, ~ay .need "clariD~tip:pobyi~ayof
a few ex)amples.;A~e;~~"."c:?!p<?r~ti~~-~ayJe.~4,capit~to
~~ ;sub
co~~tion,~t
~,~,t.e.,o~.i?,t~:r~t.p~ign~dto~~it
the needs of
:th,e,s~R~~~jary.8;~a gix~~,.~!Jme~t,.,qpe~ubsidiarymay
transfer
a resour~e..toa,sib\!~gjs~.bsidiary[,a~)~~.ething
less than the
market would yield to help the second meet outstanding obliga'618

tions. Governments are frequently directly involved. In the
1950s, the Diamond Company of Angola, a subsidiar). of De
Beers Consolidated Mines, lent millions of dollars to the Portuguese Angolan government, at 1% interest, while the market
cost of funds \\.ould have been higher. AlsO in the 1950s, the
American government's Export-Import
Bank lent money to
South African mining companies subsidiary to the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa at 4% interest at the same
time as Anglo American was lending money to its o\m subsidiaries at 6!%. While these facts would be difficult to account for in terms of the principle of maximization, they are
not at all puzzling when other principles are recognized. States
are important actors in international systems and in the supranational system as \vell, and governments representing states
seldom act on the principle of maximization of gain. Instead,
there are all manner of influences impinging on governments,
and the needs and wants of other units both internal and external to the nation are taken into account. The fact that major
American political figures and presumed "philanthropists" were
closely involved in the South African mining industry did more
to secure those government loans at 4% interest than did
market considerations. The Export-Import Bank certainly was
not maximizing its return, nor is such a principle constitutionally expected to apply to that bank as actor. Nor is its own receiving (from the U.S. Treasury upon action by Congress) contingent on what it is expected to yield.
To a considerable extent, what is true of governments in respect to the principles or decision rules governing transactions
is true also of business corporations, especially those involved
in multinational systems (Vernon 1970, 1974; Tugendhat 1971).
In the first place, they do not really go to the market for new
capital from shareholders. Increases in capital come from reinvested earnings (not distributed to those shareholders who, according to the myth, are the presumed "owners" of the companies) or from loans and financial manipulations among system
siblings, parents, and subsidiaries or similar arrangements with
major financial institutions or governments. In the second place,
the "managers," those who make the decisions about allocation
of resources, are driven not, it would seem, toward maximizing
returns, but rather toward optimizing the situation in respect to
a variety of short-term and long-term goals. Risk is clearly to
be avoided: new endeavors must be underwritten by either a
corporate or a governmental "big brother"; the joint venture
among presumably competing multinational groups is a common device for reducing risk and, in consequence, potential
gain; corporations apply a minimax strategy in following one
another into the same new areas, thereby effectively assuring
less than maximal gain for either .
I will not here develop the idea of transactional spheres. I
will say only that it seems likely that we would find characteristic modes of transaction associated with various relatively
distinct segments of the total supranational system. Surely, in
-the world minerals industry there are -characteristic ways in
which the various elements (persons, families, parent corporation, subsidiary corporation, states, producing nations, consuming nations) deal with one another that would permit the
identification of separate transactional spheres. Again, with less
variation, surely the developed countries transact with one another in one mode while they transact with developing countries
in a different mode. Some economists have identified a somewhat distinct sphere of the American national economy which
they call the "grants economy," complementary to the ordinary commercial economy (Boulding 1973, Boulding and Pfaff
1972, Boulding, Pfaff, and Pfaff 1973). Boulding and his associates have used the notion of a grants economy to interpret
~problems of the internal'American
economy: urban poverty,
,underemployment,'
educational policy,jand
urban ecology.
,'cOthers have used the dual-econo'my model developed for arialyz,'jing colonial situations (Boeke 1947, Fumivall1939)
to identify
two distinctive "economies" in America, one comprised of core
,
\ 1\" , " \ ,
,
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,
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,
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firms and one oi peripheral firms (Averitt 1968), and to identiiy
two distinct spheres in the American labor market (Piore 1971).
There is no doubt in my mind that spheres at least as distinctive can be identified with reierence to the supranational system, and the anthropological contribution to their understanding might be significant.
Anthropologists are currently engaging in debates about corporateness (e.g., Do\v 1973). This is not the place to review all
of the arguments, but it is important to note that, in the real
world, that invention of a few centuries ago, the business corporation, has been undergoing tremendous change. In terms of
size and internal structuring, and in terms of the legal status
accorded them, the modern corporation is probably the most
novel and varied social institution of the industrial period. Once
a legal fiction recognized by a state government for a strictly
limited purpose, the corporation has developed to the point that
some of its variants are operating multinationally, with virtually
unlimited purposes of their own and identities quite unrelated
to their origins and to the identities of their shareholders, and
controlling in some sense more resources than most states.
Exxon tops the list of corporations with sales of $44.9 billion
in 1975; General Motors follows with sales of $35.7 billion. On
a list of the 100 states and corporations with the largest economic products, Charles Caro (personal communication) finds
that 44 are corporations, Exxon ranking 21st and General Motors 24th. With corporations controlling not only their own
resources but also, through shareholdings and management arrangements, other corporations, we are witnessing some significant social developments. Corporations are themselves systems of organized functional parts-production
division, sales
division, planning division, intelligence division, administrative
division-so that, properly fed, they survive and grow and interact with other corporations to generate joint-venture corporations \vith lives of their own. They also combine to form
families of corporations and networks of corporations. Given
the sophistication of data-processing systems available now,
many decisions can be and are being made by computers programmed for given contingencies and strategies. By this evolutionary process, a social actor has been created which is much
less under the actual control of men than we expected it to be,
much less so than many even now think it to be. The intelligence requirements of multinational corporations are discussed
in some detail by Eells (1969), Murray (1972), and Goodman
(1976). Although it is tempting to regard this phenomenon as
science fiction, it is real-not the caricature of the giant computer printing out orders to mindless robots, but the fact of a
social system involving states, corporations, and networks of
corporations and states and persons, systematically processing
information in such a way that the higher-order system exerts
significant control over the elements organized at lower levels
of integration.

EMERGENCE

OF NOVEL MECHANISMS

OF CONTROL

Since the most fundamental property of any system is the interdependence of its components, description and understanding
of the supranational system require us to identify the ways in
which variation in anyone part falls under some degree of control by the system. The discussion of corporateness above has
touched on some aspects of this issue; here we approach it from
another perspective.
A complex, hierarchically ordered system may have parts
that are highly differentiated in terms of control. Specifically,
between two given levels Ca,h) of subunits control may be
strongly vertical, while between two higher levels Ch,c)control
may be less hierarchical, more horizontal, such that the highest
level is to be represented not by any central, apical point but
by a fairly dense set of mutual ties. In graph-theoretic terms,
the first set of relationships is a tree, the second a circuit.
'01.18
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Observations of multinational operations suggest that such
is the case in the supranational system. Industries differ markedly in mode of control, enterprises in extractive industries being
highly centralized and enterprises in manufacturing and sales
industries tending to be decentralized transnationally
(Wells
1971). At the higher levels, however, above the enterprise or
group, even the extractive industries lose their hierarchical/centralized/pyramidal
structure and adopt an interlocking/overlapping one. This latter structure is more like one of LeviStrauss's (1969) generalized wife-exchange systems, which assure the widest possible integration with no tendency toward
centrality, than it is like the ordinary view of monopoly capitalism or even oligopoly. Thus, with special reference to southern
Africa, each major multinational enterprise may be internally
centralized-for
example, the De Beers group, the Roan group,
the N e\\mont group, the Engelhard group, each a pyramid of
functionally differentiated companies. From any apex, however,
one sees a plateau upon which the major companies heading
each group are related to one another by interlocking directorates, common shareholdings, shared subsidiaries, joint ventures,
common management contracts, etc. (see Wolfe 1963 for details).
Wells (1971) speaks of the "absolute power of the headquarters" in the extraction industry. My argument is that none
of these headquarters has absolute power because each has links
with others. Wells believes that in those caseswhere direct local
governmental participation in management has occurred, as in
Zaire or Chile, it "has driven a wedge into the absolute power
of the headquarters" (p. 457). Given the kind of mutualinfluence structure that the system is, I do not believe further
involvement of governments changes it significantly. There has
been state involvement in the African supranational mineral
system for a long time. The Belgian Congo government shared
control of the Union Miniere group with the societe Generale de
Belgique and Tanganyika Concessions Limited from its beginnings. Decolonization merely brought in African government officials representing African states in place of European officials.
Instead of the Belgian colonial government working with the
societe Generale de Belgique to manage Union Miniere du
Haut Katanga, now it is the government of Zaire that works
with the societe Generale de Minerais to manage Gecamines.
Some names have changed, but the organization of production
is not markedly different. To stimulate production, the Zaire
government relieves Gecamines of all taxation relating to copper production over a certain minimum, and the profits still
go to Belgium, to societe Generale, and to Tanganyika Concessions Limited, now in the Bahamas. These new states are weak,
their governments poor, so they tend to take their places among
the companies in the system rather than try to upset it. An
advantage of the circuitous, acephalous character of the supranational system is that no coup d'etat on that plateau is possible.
I do not believe the network model can be overemphasized
in a description of the control aspect of the supranational system. Wherever one looks into the system, no matter what actors
one looks at, there is clearly a plexus of ties that relates companies, persons, governments, institutions of many kinds. No
one unit can break out in a new direction, introduce any drastic
change without other units' being aware of it and adjusting
their own strategies. If a new development appears threatening,
influences will be felt from many quarters. International financiers always explain their granting or withholding of credit by
reference to market information, but they are guided by all
system information in the network, not just market information. Individual businessmen who manage multinational
corporations are considerably controlled by knowledge of all these
interconnections. In consequence, the multinational behavior
of most companies and governments is quite predictable-systematized. The multinational actors are controlled not quite
619

as a shepherd controls a flock of sheep, but more as a flock controls its o\vn.
Vernon (1974:277) points out that the leading corporations,
sharing a capacity for mutual destruction, a concern over new
entrants, and a need to find some form of cooperative behavior,
seek "to join one another in joint ventures, follo\v one another
into ne\v locations, and establish bridgeheads on one another's
main markets." He finds all these risk-reducing behaviors to be
on the increase, evidence for us of increasing systematization.
They not only reduce risk for the corporate actors individually,
but also help resolve conflict for the system. Joint ventures aid
corporations to "move toward a common set of cost structures"
and to "observe one another's competitive behavior at closer
range," and the countervailing bridgehead behavior, sometimes
called the "exchange-of-hostage syndrome," has as object "partly to share. ..strengths and partly to encourage. ..cooperation" (Vernon 1974:277-78).
It is by such devices that sociocultural systems are generated,
as Barth (1966) has demonstrated in his analysis of fleets in
the Nor\\"egian fishing industry.

CONCLUSION
There is considerable controversy in the literature about the
relative power of multinational corporations vis-a-vis nationstates, and several authors have even drawn up lists of powers
of multinational corporations, powers of home governments, and
powers of host governments (Barnet and Muller 1974; Ewing
1972; Galloway 1971; Hymer 1972a,. Kapoor and Grub 1972;
Paquet 1972; Tugendhat 1971; Vernon 1970,1971, 1974; Wells
1971). Instructive and useful as these discussions may be, they
tend to pose the question in the wrong way. The real question
is not their powers relative to one another, but their roles in
the \vider system that encompasses as well all other known institutions. We need to apply ourselves to the task of describing
the supranational system as it is developing and the institutional
modifications that are a part of this generative social process.

Comments
by CYRIL s. BELSHAW
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T lW5. 28 VI 77
[In order to reduce the entry of personal partiality into my role
as Editor, it is my practice not to write CA commentaries or
to referee articles submitted to other journals, save in exceptional circumstances. In this instance the topic is so close to
my interests that I cannot forbear commentary, and I trust
that Associates will let me know if they feel that such contributions are improper.]
Wolfe's article is representative of a wider trend that is of
major significance for the study of society, namely, the application of perspectives and theory to the contemporary world scene
instead of limiting the application to conventional fields. His
choice of evolutionary perspectives is of course but one possible
example, and I hope that other writers will be joining the small
band which is extending the scope of, for example, social exchange theory, cognitive anthropology, structuralism, and environmental anthropology. The anthropology of the multinational corporation has many facets waiting to be opened up.
So too do the anthropology of international monetary decision
making, the anthropology of the location of industry, the ethnology of international cultural communication, and the study
of communication velocity, to name but a few topics arbitrarily.
Unfortunately,
)20

I have to point out that Wolfe has misread

me when he represents me as seeming "to presume, contrary
to my [Wolfe's] view, that state-type institutions still provide
the most likely model for understanding future human organization of \vider scale." It may be lack of clarity in my writing
(Belsha\v 1976). My arguments about the \vorld social system,
it is true, were organized around the presumption of national
"boundaries," but I then went on to sho\\' that the concept of
the national boundary is distorting our analysis of the social
reality, in both an objective and a normative context. Cultural,
economic, political relations are not realistically contained within such boundaries, and I catalogued phenomena, including
ethnicity, cultural-social relations, and political movements,
which transcended such boundaries. Then I criticized international organizations for building upon the myth of nationalism,
endeavoured to show that the "nation-state" is not and never
has been based upon ethnic nationalism, and made a case for
considering that many social science interpretations were falsely
biased by nationalistic assumptions, the national basis of data
collection, and the national preoccupations of research funding,
State-type institutions are not the best for understanding; they
inherently misunderstand.
I have one quarrel with Wolfe's substantive presentation.
That multinational or supranational corporations are changing
there can be no doubt. At the present time there are very few
truly supranational corporations; most are national corporations, controlled within particular nation-states, but operating
worldwide, directly or through subsidiaries still tightly controlled by head office. Hence a considerable variety in such organizations must be allowed for, and an evolutionary perspective must be able to handle changes, if any, in the international
distribution of management power. Furthermore, an evolutionary perspective must, I feel, be more sensitive to long-term
historical data. The commercial organization operating over
large geopolitical areas is not new. It was present in mediaeval
times, so much so that it became a natural assumption upon
which many of the early forms of colonial settlement were
founded. It was rampant in the 19th century. Modern statistics
must be handled carefully if they are not to distort the interpretation of long-term trends. The volume of cross-boundary trade
in the Roman Empire, as a proportion of "gross national product," must have been quite high, and similar conditions may
have applied historically within Asian empires. Eventually, an
evolutionary argument must be involved with data which go
beyond the recent past.

by JAMES
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lower-Ievel processes maintaining the total system. This has
the function of freeing the higher-Ievel controls to operate in
an adaptive sensing mode while the lower-Ievel systems back
up the total system by holding behavior homeostatically to a
low number of parameters set by the higher system. The higher
system is thus relieved of the burden of processing the maintenance information of the lower systems. Multinational corporations deal with the highest-Ievel management decisions in the
world industrial economy, while the subsidiaries, firms, factories, and production groups operate around financial parameters set by them. In this control system, the information
processed by the multinational corporations is kept from flowing in a meaningful way to the lower levels and to the populations at large. Also, the fact that the multinationals are involved
in seeking out and developing critical raw material resources
puts them at the forefront of sensing the energy supplies of industrial culture and therefore at the heart of the subsistence
system.
Yet, in spite of the evidence that the multinational enterprise
is a high-level control system, I do not regard it as an emergent
new level of cultural evolution because it results from, and depends on, an earlier level, the market economy. Thus we see
not the evolution of a new level but rather the development of
a new stage within an older level. If the market economy
collapses, then the multinational corporations will collapse with
it, because they are totally dependent on it for their effect on
human behavior. They do not form a complete cultural system
in themselves.
Bringing multinational corporations into the purview of anthropology is a somewhat radical step. What does this gain for
scientific understanding? One answer, clearly shown by Wolfe,
is that an ethnographic approach to the culture of the people
\\.ho make the decisions for the multinational corporations can
tell us a great deal about how the subsystem is operating. Classical economic paradigms of maximization and economic rationality are not sufficient. Here, anthropology can make more objective use of the management science techniques for understanding the interaction of computer-operated algorithms and
human decision making at the corporate level (Forrester 1961).
Anthropology can also show that industrial culture, at this
stage and at earlier ones, is just one of many possibilities for
organizing human ecology. It can alert people to the mindless
institutional systems that they set up to get what they need
at prices in human misery that they may not want to pay
(Barnet and Milller 1974:334,365). Anthropology, as probably
the only "multinational"
social science, may be well suited to
putting the multinational enterprise in a human perspective, a
perspective that it seems to have lost completely. In particular,
the needs of nonindustrial and semi-industrial cultures need to
be articulated in re!ation to the impact of the economic power
of multinational corporations. Here the words exploitation and
imperialism need not be minced, and anthropology can work
fruitfully with Marxist economic approaches to the takeo~er of
world economy by industrial institutions (Emmanuel 1972,
Amin 1974).

by LUIS MARlA GATTI
FacuUad de Filosofta y Letras, Universidad Autonoma de
Nuevo Leon, Ciudad Universitaria, Monterrey, N.L., Mexico.
10 VI 77
El trabajo de Wolfe me parece demasiado sugerente como para
detenerme en discrepancias que sostengo o en crlticas quizas
demasiado evidentes. Mas aun, tiene el gran valor de llamar
la atenci6n sobre un campo virgen para la antropologia, del que
es cada vez mas necesario ocuparse. En consecuencia, limitare
mis observaciones a dos puntos que pueden enriquecer la discusi6n.
En primer lugar, la discrepancia de Wolfe con Adams y BelVol.18
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shaw respecto de si el estado-naci6n suministra el mejor modelo
te6rico para en tender las futuras organizaciones humanas requiere, necesariamente, precisar el termino «futuro». Creo que
nadie apostaria por la eternidad del estado-naci6n como principio articulador de las fuerzas sociales, pero no veo inconveniente en reconocer que todavra-y por mucho tiempo-tal
sistema organizativo conservara su preeminencia y dominancia. En
el estado actual de desarrollo de las formaciones sociales es
previsible que el estado-naci6n seguira siendo el concepto clave,
aunque ya en lucha con las organizaciones transnacionales. (De
paso, no hace falta discutir aqur si estas organizaciones son
supra-, multi-, o transnacionales.)
En segundo lugar, Wolfe tiene raz6n al sefialar que los sistemas y unidades, como dice Steward, pueden articularse como
partes interdependientes de nuevas configuraciones, pero en tal
caso hay que mostrar c6mo ciertas caracteristicas permanecen
en nuevas estructuras y cual es su racionalidad. Esto tiene importancia en la medida en que Wolfe muestra claramente una
conexi6n sistematica entre empresa transnacional minera o
petrolera y organizaci6n difusa de grupos superpuestos, no centralizados. Cabe preguntarse entonces cual seria la correspondencia entre la forma evolutiva representada por la empresa
transnacional y la organizaci6n burocratica centralizada, tal
como se observa en empresas del tipo Ford o Nestle, no ligidas
a petroleo o minas.
Lenin y Weber coinciden en que la centralizaci6n burocratica
empresarial es la forma mas elevada de la racionalidad capitalista. lC6mo explicar entonces que la empresa transnacional-lo
mas avanzado en organizaci6n capitalista-se
articule en el
pIano de «an intricate social system based more on overlapping
membership of a variety of groups than on a bureaucratic centralization of administrative power»? La organizaci6n «difusa»
de las transnacionales mineras y / o petroleras puede estar
vinculada (sobredeterminada) por los mecanismos de sobreganancia derivados de la renta del suelo. En tal caso, los gobiernos nacionales asociados a las transnacionales (Exxon, Gecamines/parses arabes, Zaire) pasan a desempefiar el papel de
terratenientes aliados a una burguesra transnacional de nuevo
tipo.
En mi hip6tesis, entonces, donde la organizaci6n transnacional opera sobre la generaci6n de sobreganancia derivada de la
existencia de renta diferencial, las formas de asociaci6n de la
empresa (burguesra) con el estado-naci6n (terrateniente) favorecen un esquema administrativo y de alianzas difuso, no centralizado burocraticamente. El hecho de que esta sea una vieja
forma de organizaci6n social y alianza de clases realizada en el
interior de los estados-naci6n entre las clases «nacionales» correspondientes (desde la Revoluci6n Industrial inglesa, Alemania y
]ap6n en el siglo XIX, y muchos mas, sin importar aqur cual
clase sea la que instaure su hegemonia) no afecta la innovadora
originalidad deestosnuev6S tipos de organizaci6n de1a; producci6n y esta lejos de disminuir su importancia en la generaci6n
de formas socio-culturales que, agresivamente, se imponen
dra a dra.
[Wolfe's work seems to me too suggestive for me to waste time
on the discrepancies that I notice or on perhaps all too obvious
criticisms. Furthermore, it has the great value of calling attention to a virgin field for anthropology , one that it is increasingly
necessary to attend to. Consequently, I shall confine my observations to two points that may enrich the discussion.
In the first place, the discrepancy between Wolfe and Adams
and Belshaw with respect to whether the nation-state provides
the best theoretical model for understanding future human
organizations requires a clear definition of the term "future."
I believe that no one would propose the nation-state as the principal articulator of social forces for all eternity, but I see no
inconvenience in recognizing that for a long time this organiza621

tional system has been preeminent and dominant. In the present
state of development of social formations, it is predictable that
the nation-state \vill continue to be the key concept, although
now in competition \\.ith transnational organizations. (In passing, one need not discuss here whether these organizations are
supra-, multi-, or transnational.)
In the second place, \Volfe is right in pointing out that systems
and units, as Steward says, may articulate as interdependent
parts of new configurations, but in such a case one must demonstrate how certain characteristics persist in new structures and
what their rationale is. This is important in that Wolfe shows
clearly a systematic connection between transnational mining
or oil enterprise and diffuse organization of superposed, not centralized, groups. One might ask, then, what would be the correspondence between the evolving form represented by the transnational enterprise and c~ntralized bureaucratic organization
such as one observes in enterprises like Ford or Nestle, not
associated with oil or mines.
Lenin and Weber agree that bureaucratic centralization of
enterprises is the highest form of capitalist ratiO1tality. How,
then, are we to explain the fact that the transnational enterprise-the most advanced in capitalist organization-is
articulated on the plane of "an intricate social system based more on
overlapping membership of a variety of groups than on a bureaucratic centralization of administrative power"? The "diffuse" organization of the mining and/or oil transnationals may
be founded upon (determined by) the profit mechanisms derived
from the rental of land. In that case, the national governments
associated with the transnationals (Exxon, Gecamines/ Arab nations, Zaire) come to play the role of landowners allied with a
new type of transnational bourgeoisie.
My hypothesis, therefore, is that where the transnational organization operates in terms of the generation of profits derived
from the existence of differential rent, the forms of association
between the enterprise (bourgeoisie) and the nation-state
(landowner) favor a diffuse scheme of administration and alliances, not a bureaucratically centralized one. The fact that this
is an old form of social organization and class alliance found
within nation-states between the corresponding "national"
classes (in England since the Industrial Revolution, in Germany
and Japan in the 19th century, and elsewhere, ignoring here
which class restores hegemony) does not affect the innovative
originality of these ne\v types of organization of production or
at all diminish their importance in generating the sociocultural
forms that are every day aggressively asserting themselves.]

by PETER GEScmERE
Department of Cultural Anthropology, Free University, Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 18 VI 77
The subject of Wolfe's article is certainly a very important one,
not least for us anthropologists. There is an urgent need for a
dearer understanding of the functionlngof Capitalist organizations above the national level. The well-known theories, for
instance, about the parasitic role of the national bourgeoisie in
developing countries, often seem to rest on a somewhat vague
basis because of the lack of definite facts about the relations
between these national bourgeoisies and world capitalism. Consequently, an important aspect of our image of internal stratification in, for instance, African countries remains rather indefinite.
Wolfe's view that anthropological concepts in particular could
further the analysis of such supranational connections is, however, less convincing. For example, it seems doubtful whether
the anthropological conception of economic systems as consisting of different spheres could be useful in this context. Fundamental to the distinction of such spheres is that values in
one sphere can only with great difficulty be transformed into
values in the other sphere(s). This is certainly not the case for
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multinationals. These organizations are of course only possible
in a money economy, and they can only thrive on the principle
that, for money, everything is for sale.
In this part of his article, Wolfe seems to be concerned not so
much with the existence of different economic spheres as with
the existel'lce of different motives underlying the transactions
of multinationals. However, the distinction between different
spheres in tribal economies (e.g., between prestige products and
subsistence products) requires only different institutional circuits for transactions, not necessarily a difference in the motives
of the actors concerned. It is surprising that Wolfe cites Barth
in this context, because Barth in particular stresses (at least in
the publications here quoted) the "maximization of profit"
(economic, social, or political) as the decisive motive for individual behaviour in any context whatsoever. Moreover, it seems
very unlikely that a capitalist concern such as De Beer Consolidated Mines would not be ultimately guided in its transactions by profit making. The examples Wolfe gives only seem
to demonstrate that such corporations are based on long-term
calculations of profit and that they attempt to minimize risks
in the hope of maximizing profit over a longer period.
In general, I am not yet convinced that our insights into the
recent development of world capitalism are inhibited primarily
by a lack of models for our analysis. There may be a more urgent
need for facts (how multinationals in practice support regimes
in developing countries, how they cooperate among each other
and with governments of industrial states) ; our problem may
be more that vital information is sometimes hard to obtain. As
far as I am concerned, the examples of transactions by multinationals in Wolfe's article are especially interesting.
Recent publications suggest another perspective in which an
anthropologist could make a more modest but, for me at least, a
clearer contribution to the analysis of recent developments in
world capitalism: Wallerstein's (1974) accent on the essential
role that "semiproletarians" still play in modern capitalism
and, in the same vein, Meillassoux's (1975) demonstration of
the continuing significance of the "domestic mode of production" for the reproduction of the labour needed in the capitalist
sector of society. According to Meillassoux, the logic of capitalism requires not so much the complete demolition of the
"domestic" relations of production as the partial preservation
of the "domestic" community so that the costs of the reproduction of labour are borne only to a limited extent by the capitalist
sectors. On the one hand, this perspective seems very promising
because it concerns a process which is vital in all capitalist developments (for the multinationals as much as for earlier patterns in world capitalism) : the creation of the "free" labour
necessary to keep the capitalist machinery turning. On the
other hand, this perspective seems to offer anthropologists clear
possibilities of using facts and insights accumulated in our discipline. According to Meillassoux, the process of "primitive accumulation" is still going on; this implies that it is still essential
for the development of capitaiism that productive forces, especially labour, be transferred from precapitalistic production
sectors to capitalistic organizations. Therefore anthropological
analyses of precapitalist modes of production and of their
transformation under the influence of capitalism can offer important insights into recent phenomena in the development of
world capitalism (for instance, the role of migrant labour in
many European countries, but also the policies of multinationals; typical anthropological questions could be, in this perspective, to what extent the transfer of industrial equipment
to developing countries enables multinationals to profit more
thoroughly from the reproduction of cheap labour within the
"domestic community" or how long the "domestic community"
will still be capable of reproducing labour).
It is to be hoped that Wolfe will continue his studies: a case
study of a multinational along the theoretical lines he sketches
could be most rewarding.
CURRENT
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by ALAX ~I. KLEIN
EvergreenState College,Olympia, rVash. 98501, U.S.A. 14 VI 77
Wolfe is to be applauded for calling our attention to a current
sociocultural dynamic that promises to have macroevolutionary
significance. Having noted the significance of the multinational
corporation in evolutionary terms, he has, however, failed to
devise a suitable schema within which to trace its micro development or, for that matter, to treat it contemporaneously.
This stems from three basic errors (of which space permits me
to deal \\-ith only the first) : (1) his confusion of economic with
sociocultural entities and levels; (2) his attempt to discuss
change using a static model (e.g., one in which entities are seen
as passive recipients of change on the part of the multinational
corporation) ; and (3) his only partial awareness of what his
predecessors in the field(s) he examines have claimed (for instance, many of his remarks are directly attributable to Marx,
although he weakens the theoretical impact by assigning them
to Steward).
While in reality the interpenetration of political, social, and
economic entities is dramatic and pervasive, we must analytically separate them in order to facilitate comprehension of their
workings and interrelationships. In discussing "supranational
organization of production," Wolfe is dealing with economic
phenomena, yet he places them in a sociocultural evolutionary
context. Legros (1977) has recently pointed out the incompatibility of these t\VO social sectors in a single model. Confusion of
political with economic levels of analysis is likewise at the root
of Wolfe's exaggerated claim for antipathy between the multinational corporation and the nation-state. It is not that the two
do not oppose one another, but rather that their conflict must be
viewed as a dynamic tension which serves the interests of both.
Both multinational corporation and nation-state, as at present
constituted, fall under the rubric of the world capitalist market.
One cannot examine the multinational corporation apart from
its capitalist base. In attempting to do so, Wolfe remains oblivious to the contradictions which threaten to undo the entire
enterprise-class conflict on a global scale (within nations as
well as between developed and underdeveloped sectors) ; capitalist competition, centralization, and its concomitant aggravation
of the human condition; and ruinous search for global profit. In
fact, contrary to Wolfe's unexplained assertion that analysis
of the multinational corporation as an outgrowth of the oligopoly is nonpredictive and lacking in explanatory power, examining it in its capitalist context has been the only means of dealing
with it (Baran 1968, Baran and Sweezy 1964, Barnet and
Muller 1974, O'Conner 1974). In this fundamental sense, Wolfe
has missed any opportunity for substantive analysis.
Within an economic rubric, Wolfe has indiscriminately mixed
levels of production and exchange, an error which detracts from
analytical rigor (see ¥eillassoux 1972). This is exemplified by
his attempt to look at multicentric exchange within the framework !:!fP!oduction.
The aforementionedproorems ultiinately express themselves
in Wolfe's assessment of the interaction between multinational
corporations and the nation-state. He sees the multinational
corporation as a monolithic structure, free of structural contradictions and operating in an open field; in actuality, a devastating form of competition erodes our picture of it as rational and
omnipotent.
Perhaps the most limited perception of all is that the relationship between the state (sociopolitical) and the multinational
corporation (economic) is one of direct confrontation. That both
of these entities will in time be qualitatively altered is true, but
it is erroneous to assume that, as now defined, one will triumph
over the other. Each of them serves at one time complementary
and conflicting purposes. It would be more fruitful to look at the
multinational corporation as existing both within and between
nation-states-not
beyond them. Without U.S. military presence (or the threat of it), the "stability"
so crucial for global
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production and marketing would be impossible. Through its
ability to administer civilly, tax, control social and political
climates, and redistribute wealth, the nation-state serves to
facilitate the multinational
corporation's search for global
profits. Indeed, the latter is not prepared to cope with the multifaceted responsibilities of the nation-state, and this makes opposition to it necessarily ambivalent. Wolfe's strong point is
to be found in his treatment of the negative side of the relationship between these two entities, yet he tends to speculate too
much as regards the long-range movement of this tension and
thereby weakens'his analysis of the present.
The influence of the multinational corporation in political
arenas must not be mistaken for its structural purpose; rather,
it is the inevitable outcome of the organic composition of society. That the multinational corporation lies between nations
facilitates its simultaneous appearance as an organizational outlaw and a boon to the state, yet one cannot conclude that this
inter-national status is indicative of transcendence-that
would
come with the ultimate transcendence of capitalism, the life
impulse of the entire affair. Confusing a social formation based
on modes of production with a sociocultural entity will prevent
us from explaining this very real tension, let alone predicting
its future direction.

by CHET S. LANCASTER
Department of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma, Norman,
Okla. 73019, U.S.A. 23 v 77
.-\1though new crops and techniques may be taken up, the subsistence economy of a low-density society is unlikely to change
drastically or develop much supralocal impact unless spurred
by external influences, increasing or changing local demand,
and/ or population pressure (Boserup 1965) .Especially in stateless low-density societies, the subsistence economy is likely to
be a household concern designed to satisfy predictable consumption needs. If occasional household surpluses are produced in lowdensity shifting horticultural or gathering-hunting groups, they
are likely to be unpredictable, inadvertent, small, and interspersed with periods of lesser output (Sahlins 1972). Informal
kin and friendship networks will usually be sufficient to absorb
excess food production; except in the case of livestock, it is unlikely that exchangeable produce will have to be transported
more than a few miles to the intended place of consumption.
Unless the local demand network expands significantly, regularly frequented fixed marketplaces and highly evolved methods
of exchange are unlikely to exist. The low-density subsistence
economy, together with its corresponding "capital economy"
producing utilitarian material goods and tools, is likely to remain a domestic endeavor. It will have little of the historical
and cross-cultur~limpact com~only exhibited by long-distance
trade networks dealing in prestige goods which connect local
palace economies or local politically motivated centers of redistributive exchange.
As opposed to the producing levels of the low-density subsistence economy (concerned with food, a limited inventory of
capital items, and material goods designed for household use) ,
the political or prestige sector of the economy, in which individual and group status considerations are principally involved, will
usually have fewer geographical constraints and a larger "market area" corresponding more or less with the locally relevant
political field (Lancaster 1976).
Analogous with modern supranational enterprise, with its
global reach, long-distance trade in low-density societies has
also involved interethnic (or international) production and integration, as seen for example in the trade for ivory , copper ,
and slaves in precolonial southeastern Africa (Alpers 1975).
What sharply distinguishes more recent situations can be
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measured in terms of volume, distances, organizational complexity, trade value added by successive refining, processing,
and manufacturing stages, the relative \vealth and power of
controlling groups in the political economy, the extent to which
household consumption and household members, as labor, are
enmeshed in systems influenced by the greatly expanded, vertically integrated political economy, and the extent to which
market rules permeate the system (Polanyi 1944, 1947). As
population, demand, market areas, economic volume, and the
power of controlling groups have grown historically, the aboriginallow-density exchange nexus of central places once marked
by the location of individual households and later by periodic
marketplaces has evolved into a higher-Ievel network linking
large industrialized regions of the world.
It seems to me that the evolution of supranational organization has two major implications for anthropologists, especially
those interested in economics.
The first has to do with "economic development," which tends
to take place as supranational industrial integration spreads
through massive direct and indirect investment, i.e., market
penetration, in developing countries. Since it is directed from
the top, this expansion can obviously make it difficult for the
average individual to benefit from development activity on his
own land. The experience of pre-Mao China gives stark evidence of this (Snow 1973). Again, because decisions are made
at the top of the industrialized world, there has been a tendency
in economic development to export an often inappropriate,
sometimes damaging, and seemingly unsustainable energydependent, high-impact technology to the remaining parts of
the world still at the low-density level, even while the developed
nations are experiencing declining returns and diseconomies
from the use of such technology (Hardin 1972, Schumacher
1973, Georgescu-Roegen 1975,.Brown 1975, Greenland 1975,
Chancellor and Gross 1976). Anthropologists must stay alive
to these problems, whether we study "up" or "do\vn" or simply
try to make ends meet in the private sector of our own economy.
Second, the evolution of supranational organization should
focus attention on the concept of political economy. While the
level of organization Wolfe describes is new, the earlier level
of states and nations also represented powerful political economies able to influence history. In the time of Plato's Republic
and after, the political economy was dominated by the values
of a hereditary landed aristocracy of farmers. Neither Aristotle
nor Aquinas approved of commerce merely for gain, and commercialism was considered corrupt throughout Roman times.
Agricultural production was still the mainstay of the political
economy of medieval Europe. By the 16th century, the feudal
agrarian state had been replaced in Europe by a merchant state
based on the Mercantile Revolution, which saw a great rise in
urbanism, production for sale, and use 9f money and skyrocketing growth in trade and markets, many of them colonial. A
century later, Adam Smith spoke for private enterprise in manufacturing and the rising new class of industrialists and in doing
so founded the classical school in economics. After the Industrial Revolution, the basis of the dominant new political economy of Europe was industrialized production, and so it remains
on an increasingly worldwide scale. In earlier times, the political
economy of a low-density society might be based on the prestige
value of exotic long-distance trade goods and regional produce
serving as symbols of tribute. Later, in the era of the classic
Greek city-states, the Roman Empire, and medieval Europe,
the political economy was based on agrarian produce from increasingly scarce and more intensively exploited land. Still
later, it was based on mercantile exports. In each era, economic
relationships and ideas adjusted themselves to the changing
social, political, demographic, and technological realities of the
times, and one of the main forces underlying the generation of
successive cultural systems has clearly been the adapting force
of political economy (Lancaster 1976). History therefore suggests that it is the political and ideological framework within
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\vhich any economy must operate that should concern us most.
Yet since the 19505economic anthropolog). has been most noted
for its programmatic debate between substantivists, who seem
to say there are no economies worth substantive study in lowdensity societies, and formalists, \vho seem to say that all
economies should be seen from the perspective of our own possibly peculiar moment in time.
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scalar
(1972),
capi(oper-

ating in many industries) and multinational (operating in many
countries)." This is so because, under monopoly capital, for a
firm to expand, it must
transcend its history. It was born and grew up producing and selling
a certain product in a certain region. It must learn to overcomeboth
thesehistorical limitations. It must, in other words, strive to acquire
new markets in both the product and geographical senses.The one
necessarilyleads to conglomeration; the other more or lessdirectly to
various forms of multinationalism.
Moreover, "organization"
breeds further
"organization."
Sweezy, explicitly agreeing with Galbraith here, writes:
The modern giant corporation has a profound need to dominate and
control all the conditions and variables which affect its viability. And
this explains. ..why, for example, the giant corporation, as soon as
it feelsstrong enough to do so, t)"pically movesfrom export to production abroad; and why it strives \vith might and main to control,
directly or in concert with another giant corporation, governments
wherever it operates.
These treatments of multinationals are far superior to Wolfe's,
conceptually and theoretically. To single out a sentence from
the work of Magdoff and to suggest from it that Marxists have
not treated the subject of multinationals is a mockery. It is a
conclusion based on the fact that Wolfe's references are limited
to whatever is available in bourgeois journals. This is unfortunate-but
it shows the tragedy of specialization characteristic
of disciplinary loyalty.
To study multinational
corporations, Wolfe suggests, the
theoretical approach that promises an adequate frame of
reference is sociocultural evolution as proposed by Steward.
This is because these corporations are "only overgrown versions
of the business corporations invented centuries ago, and the
states whose futures we are wondering about now are only
modifications of those invented a few thousand years ago."
Simply put, nothing ever changes; it simply grows bigger or
worse. Wolfe writes: "In evolution, it would appear that changes
in relationships cumulate at an increasing rate up to a critical
point at which the new system exerts some control."
The treatment of multinationals by Wolfe sho\vs that he has
no logic of history-only
the logic of his artificial model, which
he wants to impose on reality in order to justify the activities
of the multinational corporations. For instance, he suggests
that the structure of multinationals is like the tribal structure
of the Aranda of Australia or the Tallensi of Ghana. Because
supranationals are above the level of nation-state, Wolfe treats
them as "a new system at a supranational level of integration."
That is, societies can be ordered according to the highest level
or organizational system each has evidenced; thus band societies, tribal societies, chiefdoms, and nation-states have all at
one time existed as independent entities which were later incorporated into larger, more rational organizations. The implication of these earlier developments is clear-since the nationstate, as currently organized, is a hindrance to the multinational corporation, then the multinational, with its superior
organization, could justifiably incorporate the nation-state in
a new system at a higher level of integration. Dismissing those
who inquire into the power of multinationals vis-3.-vis nationstates as asking the wrong question, Wolfe concludes: "The
real question is not their powers relative to one another, but
their roles in the wider system that encompasses as well all
other known institutions. We need to apply ourselves to the
task of describing the supranational system as it is developing
and the institutional modifications that are a part of this generative social process."
Thus Wolfe sees multinationals as the result of a natural
process of evolution in which human society is moving by its
own logic to a higher plane. He is not really interested in studying and explaining the new imperialism of the multinational
corporations. He is simply interested in describing what he calls
the supranational system. This concern, of course, is at the heart
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of conservative work in the social sciences, which is not so much
theory as an effort to give a photographic picture of reality.
Having oversimplified and misapplied Steward's theory of
sociocultural evolution, Wolfe has produced a theory that apologizes for and legitimizes the multinational as fulfilling the laws
of nature. He is unable and/or un\villing to see that capitalism
and the multinationals it has spawned are nothing but the
extension of the imperialist phase of capitalist development.
The interests of the emergent nation-states and multinational
corporations are incompatible. This accounts for the intense
struggle now growing more and more acute between the national
state and the international monopolies over all key issues of
economic policy. The internationalization
and socialization of
production and the private appropriation of the surplus creates
a supreme contradiction of the capitalist mode of production.
Only revolutionary action and the creation of socialism can overcome the present dilemma. Therefore, criticism of multinational
corporations must puncture the myth of the inevitability
of
their domination, not by denying their organizational and technical superiority, but by relating them critically and in a revolutionary fashion to the growth of monopoly capitalism, thus
pointing to a need to transcend the exploitative world structure they have created.

by JOAN MILLER
Marianopolis College, 3880 Cote des lVeiges Rd., Montreal,
P.Q., Ca1Jada838 JWJ. 16 VI 77
I wish to congratulate Wolfe for his attempt to bring an understanding of the generation of a supranational level of sociocultural integration to the attention of anthropologists. Although
increasing numbers of anthropologists work within contexts
made more complex by the internationalization
of production
and the emergence of supranational systems, these same anthropologists must search long and hard, if they search at all,
to find attempts to explain these phenomena within the anthropologicalliterature.
For this reason I can only support Wolfe's
efforts, even though I do not find them totally successful. He
has done many of us a service by bringing his paper to a journal
such as CURRENTANTHROPOLOGY,
and my comments here are
made in the hope of encouraging him and others to continue
work in this direction.
First, although I have always felt that Steward's work offered
much to those who would try to explain developments within
nation-states and have been disappointed that it has so infrequently been so employed, I regret that Wolfe's use of it
has not been more comprehensive and rigorous. He could, I
think, have made his arguments more. consistent and given
his work greater power of explanation had he employed the idea
of "culture core" (Steward 1955:39-42). His arguments concerning the organization of production, modes and spheres of
transactions, and the generation of horizontal mechanisms of
control at this highest level of interaction would focus with
greater clarity on the basic issues were they presented within
such a framework. In addition, such inconsistencies as that between the early argument that "the creation of a new system
...is only indirectly connected with technoenvironmental phenomena" and the later discussion of the importance of varieties
of information and information-processing technologies (computers and the mathematical modeling they make possible)which would certainly seem to fall within the domain of technoenvironmental phenomena-could be avoided.
Second, two comments about the structuring of the paper .
Although I realize that Wolfe is presenting a framework for
analysis, I feel that such frameworks are both better understood
and better evaluated if they are accompanied by a sufficiently
substantial example of their application. Wolfe's illustrations
are not sufficient for my taste; they merely whet my appetite.
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I \vould have found a rigorous case study well worth the space
it might have occupied. I feel the same about Wolfe's discussion
of time. To speak about the "dialectic between time on a macroscale and time on a log scale" or "the complexity of time as a
property at different levels of an evolving hierarchical system"
without plotting these out or providing further explanation is
to tantalize but not really to clarify. Again, and especially in
this difficult area, one wishes for more explanation.
Finally, '\'olfe has addressed himself to a significant area
which anthropologists should be looking at with more diligence
than they have, and he has done so by building upon existing
anthropological approaches. It is through such activity that
our understanding and our discipline can expect to advance.
Though flawed, Wolfe's work is an important step in one of the
right directions.

by JUNE XASH
Ph.D. Program in Anthropology, Graduate Center, City University of :yew York, 33 W. 42 St., New York, N.Y. 10036,
U.S.A. 17 VI 77
Wolfe is a pioneer in the analysis of multinational corporations.
His 1963 article on the African mineral industry is a reminder
that not all anthropologists in the '60s were blind to the presence of international corporations when in the field. Although
the problem he chose to analyze was unorthodox in anthropology , his perspective has been and remains anthropological. He
sets the multinational corporations in a time spanning thousands of years and examines their impact holistically, using
Julian Steward's framework for looking at national integration
as his basic approach.
His enthusiasm for anthropological models leads him to the
analogy for multinational corporations of segmentary clans as
in the tribal structure of the Aranda of Australia or of the
Tallensi of Ghana. This analogy rests on the feature of complementary ties and cleavages between different kinds of chiefs.
The anthropological ploy is, I think, misleading. The emergent
international system lacks the central feature of segmentary
clan structures-a moral/ideological system binding the segments together and enabling new, autonomous units to develop
without cultivating a sense of competition. The expansive
process of the multinational corporations is not that of the
hiving off of autonomous and distinct subsets replicating the
parent organization, as the kinship analogy suggests, but a
continual process of concentration and control. The illusion of
autonomy is sometimes created in response to the nationalistic
demands of the host country , while the real control remains
through the budgetary audit in the central office. Finally, the
analogy fails to help us understand the multinational-corporation phenomenon. The segmentary lineage is inherently limited
in its growth, and the process of hiving off is a manifestation
of these limits. The multinational corporation, on the other
hil.nd;h8.Sil.n imperative to grow~ This Is a result both oftne
capital-intensive nature of production, which makes laborintensive activities noncompetitive, and of the stress on innovation rather than price competition. Only the big firms can
sustain the research staff required for innovative processes to
be built into company planning.
In his use of Steward's thesis of levels of integration, Wolfe
fails to see the contradiction between this model and that of
the segmentary lineage. The crucial factor in Steward's schema
is that preceding organizational units "become modified as
specialized, dependent parts of a new kind of total configuration" (Steward 1973:51). Steward shows, in his illustration of
the Navaho during the New Deal, that "dependence upon livestock as cash produce for a national market puts them into
competition with one another, and threatens to destroy the
native culture" (p. 57). This growth process, in sharp contrast
with the benign growth of segmentary lineages, leads to the
destruction of alternative modes of adaptation. Its stress on
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size and high capital inputs puts the multinational corporations
somewhat in the position of the dinosaurs, \vhose sheer size, a
selective advantage in the face of potential competition in the
period of expansion, became the basis of their own extinction
\Vhen food supplies diminished. Agreements and collusive contracts with competitors often make it impossible to respond
adaptively to change. Thus new growth and flexibility are lost
as given tendencies become crystallized and irreversible. The
utopian scene envisioned by Vernon and accepted by Wolfe,
in which joint ventures and corporations "move toward a common set of cost structures" and "observe one another's competitive behavior at closer range," resulting in the sharing of
strengths and the encouragement of cooperation, ignores the
inherent contradictions within the international system.
These contradictions can be summarized as follows:
1. A new protectionism is encouraged by international management as the firms gain a foothold behind the tariff barriers
that once excluded them. The trend from 1945 to 1970 was
toward freer trade, but by the latter 1960s, many corporations
had begun to push for protectionism (Stephenson 1972:90-91).
2. Nationalism is stimulated by the very presence of the
multinational corporation, making demands on the firm which
limit the type of activity, regulate the share of ownership,
stipulate the percentage of foreign personnel, and limit local
capital input (Stauffer 1973:26). Labor has turned to the
nation-state, paradoxically the very seat of bourgeois power
in the rise of capitalism, to defend its shrinking control over
jobs. The power of strike is lost as the multinational corporations range freely over the globe in search of the cheapest, most
submissive labor force.
3. The multinational corporations use the U .S. government
as a broker in major negotiations. Salera (1969:274) cites the
case of a large bauxite company which \vas asked by a South
American firm to pay going electric rates instead of the preferred rates they had enjoyed. The U .S. government stepped
in to get the host country to reduce customs duties on products
imported by the subsidiary of the company, in turn getting
the company to pay an 8% increase in rates. They sealed the
deal with an agreement to accelerate delivery of Public Law 480
wheat to the host country. The national base of operation of
the big companies is undeniably important. The presence of the
U.S. army and other .guarantees of a favorable investment
climate have given the United States priority in the spread of
branches of U .S.-based firms.
4. The factor allocation on market principles is no longer universalizing. A major consideration in the decision to locate
firms is the political climate of the host country. Even mildly
reformist, populist governments are considered suspect. Gabriel
(1972:97) states that "there is, in fact, a fundamental contradiction in the notion-explicitly
pressed by many policy-makers
in the advanced nations-that
less-developed countries should
move toward representative government and social reforms
whi!ema.intaining investment climates hospitable to foreign investors." The illusion that direct foreign investments liberalize
and democratize the host governments is not cultivated in
business circles, where a more hardheaded view such as that
of Gabriel prevails.
Wolfe passes judgment on Marxist analysis of multinational
corporations, stating that it has not moved beyond the Leninist
doctrine of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. Palloux (1973) is among the Marxists who have analyzed the internationalization of capital as a social relationship. One important
point he makes is that, as the division of labor moves to an internationallevel, the division between mental and manual labor
becomes nationalized. In other words, the mental activities are
performed in the advanced capitalist centers, while the laborintensive operations are pushed into less-developed areas. He
points to the deepening of inequality among nations as the international corporate structure develops.
Wolfe's article is subtitled " An Evolutionary Perspective."
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If one \\"ere to follow through on this, I think the stress might
be on the dis-integrative tendencies already apparent in a world
order based on multinational corporations. The lack of a moral,
ideological base already threatens the survival of the giant
firms in the face of popular unrest. With many developers and
international planners attracted to the thesis that "small is
beautiful" {Schumacher 1973), it would be a mistake for anthropologists to assume that the corporate dinosaurs are the model
of the futute world order.
by WILLIAM H. NEWELL
Department of Anthropology, University of Sydney, Sydney,
N.S.W. 2006, Australia. 10 v 77
It is not clear to me exactly what the author of this paper is
trying to show. If it is that multinational corporations are
totally dissimilar from forms of social unit such as the state,
then I think that he has failed. Whether a multinational corporation becomes international depends largely on whether the
state which forms its base can provide the various raw materials,
technical know-how, specialised-skilled personnel, etc., to fulfil
its aims within the state's territorial boundaries. As far as
Australia is concerned, the various Japanese companies that
share responsibility with some Australian firms for the provision of capital for the exploitation of minerals \vould certainly
prefer not to invest if they could obtain guaranteed raw materials to keep their home factories operating in some other way.
The Japanese company which was forced to take over the control of the woodchip plant in Eden, New South Wales, \Vhen
the original all-Australian company went bankrupt did so un\villingly. It was almost forced to interfere in Australian affairs
to maintain its raw-material supply. The packaging material
made for the Japanese out of Australian woodchips is a small
but essential part of the manufacture of electronic equipment.
The emphasis is on guaranteed supplies, not on profits, in the
case of most J apanese companies in Australia.
On the other hand, the attempt by an Australian company to
finance and establish a racecourse and betting system in Indonesia was without doubt an attempt to make large profits.
The control of the large alumina plant at Gladstone, Queensland, rests ultimately with the small group of American engineers \Vho have an exclusive contract to maintain and repair
its chemical equipment. From the company's point of view,
who cares whether the manager of the Gladstone plant is an
Australian or not, as long as he undertakes to maintain the
present sales and maintenance contracts?
To try to explain the supranational organisation of production in terms of parallels with the Aranda or Tallensi, or by
means of some mysterious process such as that by which "a
flock of sheep controls its own," or by some apparently unilineal evolutionary scheme is too imaginative. The various aims
of multinationRI corporations are not too difficult to understand
o:nc~one has the field data on which to base a judgment. The
difficulty lies in obtaining those data. I would also hesitate to
exclude from study the equivalent of the multinational corporation in socialist countries, just as I would hesitate to explain
the behaviour of multinational corporations in capitalist countries by general evolutionary theories. We are at present just
at the stage of acquiring our field data. A short pseudo-theoretical paper such as this has so many as yet unsupported ideas
that it confuses more than it helps. Perhaps in the future, with
more detailed analyses of specific decisions, we may be able to
formulate more general theories; but we have not yet reached
that stage.
by JAY O'BRIEN
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Khartoum, P.o. Box 321, Khartoum, Sudan. 20 v 77
It is encouraging to see anthropologists attempting to come to
grips with the important problem of the multinationals. It is
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unfortunate, ho\vever, that Wolfe's paper obscures rather than
clarifies what the problem is. Nowhere does he mention the
involvement of the multinationals
in exploiting the Third
World or metropolitan workers. Recent scandals arising from
political intervention by multinationals-e.g.,
ITT in Chile,
Gulf Oil in Angola, arms and aircraft companies elsewhere-go
unremarked. Authors who link such phenomena to the basic
nature of multinationals are ignored, with the exception of
Magdoff, who is dismissed out of hand with the comment that
he sees multinationals as imperialist outgrowths of nationally
based monopoly capitalism. These defects in Wolfe's paper
represent not only monumental empirical oversights, but a
theoretical confusion which leads him to focus on organizational
forms of management/investment units to the exclusion, despite
his title, of any analysis of the production process itself.
Poulantzas (1975) clearly shows that the worldwide economic
developments Wolfe refers to spring from a twofold process
involving the internationalization
of the socialization of the
labor process and the internationalization
of capital. This
process is characterized by the establishment of complex production units under a single economic control and integrating
several labor processes situated in various plants in a number
of countries. The resulting socialization of labor on a global
scale is not due chiefly to technological factors but is a function
of major changes in the worldwide social division of labor, particularly the intensification of the exploitation of metropolitan
labor to counteract down\vard pressures on profit rates. Poulantzas explains this as follows (1975:63):
This increase in the rate of exploitation is the resultant both of the
level of wages and the productivity of labour-which includes the
degreeof technological development, the particular skills involved in
the current development of the productive forces, etc. The wage level
and the productivity of labour are, in the long run, closely related. In
other words, the rate of exploitation and of surplus-value is not measurable simply in terms of the wage level. It also involves the intensive exploitation of labour: i.e. new technical processes,the diversification of products, the intensification of labour and its rhythm. A
higher wage, in money or even real terms, may correspond, according
to the development of the productive forces, to a smaller proportion
of the value produced, and thus to a more intense exploitation, than
a lo\ver wage in the context of a lower productivity of labour.
The multinational corporation embodies three main features
of the process: (1) The development of bases of accumulation
for a particular firm in several different countries, thus extending the social base of capital. (2) The increasing trend toward
combination under single ownership of capital coming from a
number of countries. "The 'origin' of this capital," as Poulantzas shows (p. 60), "is not a question of its nationality.
.., but
rather of the place where the original and/or dominant social
relations which compose the capital are constructed." Companieswhichareriot decisively controlled from a single dominating country are extremely rare. (3) The process of internationalization has been taking place under the decisive domination of
capital based in the U .S.A. About 40 of the 50 largest multinationals are essentially American firms with operations (including plant) in other countries. Poulantzas provides extensive
documentation of the various ways in which American capital
builds and exercises this domination.
It should be clear that the multinationals .are in fact multinational in only a limited sense. Wolfe's failure to grasp this
results from his institutional approach, which regards the multinationals as "sociocultural" units to be analyzed from the point
of view of the form and site of their decision-making and executive behavior. A more illuminating
analysis would have to
recognize that the formal organization and behavior of these
units are secondary social processes which can only be explained
through analyzing the social relations operating within thembeginning from the labor process itself and the direct confronta627

tion of labor and capital-and
upon which they are based.
Among other things, such an analysis would conclude that the
multinationals, while not confined \vithin the national state, are
subject to and determined by social processes which operate at
the level of the individual social formation governed by a national state. Such an analysis cannot be carried out in this brief
comment. I refer the reader to Poulantzas, Braverman (1974),
and O'Brien (1977).

by DAVID PITT
Department of Sociology, University of A uckland, Private Bag,
Auckwnd, New Zealand. 13 v 77
Wolfe needs to be congratulated for a perceptive essay on a
most important topic, but there are critical parts that need to
be developed further, and some contradictions.
First, the author claims, and I think rightly, that there is a
need for more holistic models, perhaps of the Steward (1955)
kind, and (in his conclusion) more description. The two clearly
need to run together, but we should recognize that we do not
really have an ethnography of the multinationals, certainly
not the sort of ethnography that Steward had at his disposal.
There are, moreover, very real difficulties in obtaining the
necessary ethnographies. Supranational organizations and networks are, as the author recognizes, sprawling, anonymous
networks, in which images and realities vary at different points
of the structure. Then there is the problem of access itself,
especially to the HQs from whence the genealogies spring. This
is clearly not a village situation in which the research worker
has the patronage of a colonial power, or a university, etc.
Secondly, I think the author is right to stress the myth of
national frames of reference, but this needs a fuller theoretical
consideration of the nature of national boundaries or, indeed,
social boundaries generally. Boundaries seem not only to contain, but to be defined by crossing, so that both sides of a
boundary may be affected and influenced by a social process.
A multinational like Nestle, for example, has many "Swiss"
characteristics-capital,
paternalistic organization, etc., even
down to the. chocolate totem. In its manifold international
operations, however, it is hardly a vehicle of Swiss imperialism
in the Marxist sense. It is some part of Switzerland, but abroad
-outside the national-boundary fence and influence. Multinationals, then, are not new nations, or imperialist extensions (as
the Marxists claim), but ne\v kinds of collectivities that exist
around and across boundaries. This kind of boundary, down
the middle as opposed to the outside, is probably nothing new,
since many old boundary concepts in the social sciences derived
not only from an overemphasis on national frames, but also
from undue reliance on physical-science concepts.
Wolfe is also right to emphasize novel mechanisms of control.
The essence may well be like the Levi-Straussian generalized
wife-exchange systems or, perhaps, the Maussian gift exchanges.
However, there still needs to be some direction given, if only
a precedent and a primum mobile. In this the committee plays
an important part. This fits well with the anonymity, the
technocracy, the hierarchy and its proliferation. It provides a
(ritual?) forum for resolving conflict and for power manipulation. It is a prime agent of socialization. More basically, it
permits the boundary crossing in time that is a counterpart of
spatial extension. The supranational world, then, is a committocracy, to coin yet another unwanted neologism. This may be
true of nations, too. The historian A. J. P. Taylor, for example,
told the British Historical Association in London in April that
the new dictatorships, East and West, are by committees whose
names nobody can remember. Perhaps, then, the national structures are reflecting the new supranational structures rather than
the other way around.
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by BARBARAJ. PRICE
New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 16 v 77
If economic and political anthropology do not or cannot deal
systematically with the emergent phenomenon of the multinational, they are to that extent limited. Wolfe's paper is therefore especially welcome as a strong indicator of productive
future directions. I fully concur that an evolutionary framework
is well suited to the analysis of the processes involved, and regret only that Wolfe's somewhat scattershot use of the paradigm
tends to dissipate its potential explanatory power. Underlying
the evolutionary paradigm is White's dictum that culture
evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita increases;
this focuses attention upon this aspect of the multinational in
comparison with other forms of energy capture and distribution. The materialist premise holds, moreover, that there is
regularity in the association of a given technoeconomic infrastructure (which produces energy) and the locus and organization of power (which determine its flow). The emergence of the
multinational represents, in these terms, an expansion of the
scale of production and the increasing quantitative dominance
of these organizations in a world economy having less and less
relationship to the boundaries of national states. We are dealing with a shift in the mode of production and the concomitant
emergence of a new, more complex, level of sociocultural integration.
A shift in the mode of production is an irrevocable alteration
of the man/energy relationship. While the substantive developments involved in the emergence of the multinationals are new,
there are nonetheless regularities inherent in the process. Elements found conjoined in a shift are generally already present
as isolated or occasional means of intensifying a preexisting,
pre-shift economy. A shift, in other words, represents a change
in the relative amounts of energy produced by different sectors
of an economy, and thus in the relations among such sectors.
The irrigation revolution, for example, takes place not as a result of the "invention" of irrigation (this had occurred earlier,
with canal irrigation on a restricted scale used to increase the
yield or security of an essentially rainfall agriculture), but as a
result of the expansion of its scale to the point where it comes
to underwrite the bulk of agricultural production and, concomitantly, determine the principal sociopolitical institutions as well.
This overall developmental pattern is followed in the case of
the multinational. As with any shift in the mode of production,
Romer's rule-a statement of the short-term operation of natural selection, its opportunism in favor of what works best under
existing conditions, with long-term potentials or transformations analytically irrelevant and epiphenomenal-is applicable.
The historical antecedents of the phenomenon, as individual
components, embedded in changing economic and political contexts, vary in time depth. Colonial empires represent the differential expansion of national states, themselves the product' of
earlier levels of economic expansion and institutional patterning.-Merely-dOCumenting
these predeceSSO-isoitne historiCal
lineages of individual elements does not, of course, explain the
shift in production and in organization. Variant forms of energy
production and distribution are constantly and randomly arising: our problem must be the explanation of the differential
survival of the variants. This is nonrandom, governed by the
operation of natural selection.
Evolutionary theory is ultimately a competitive model, differing therefore as an explanation of stability and change from
the analysis of the historical transmission of institutions. In an
extension to cultural phenomena of the principle of competitive
exclusion, it may be noted that, all else being equal, the more
efficient form supplants the less efficient when both do similar
work in comparable contexts. Analysis of cultural transformations is thus most productive on a basis of the changing work
done by the institutions in question. The geographic proliferation of the multinationals suggests, in these systems of greatly
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expanded scale and highly rationalized production, that they
out-compete potential competition. To that extent, they are
adaptive traits. They should repay analysis in terms of the material conditions under which they operate.
An asymmetrical association of dominant "developed" and
subordinate "underdeveloped" components characterizes the
organization of the multinational as itself a system. While this
observation is rooted in part in the heritage of colonialism, its
persistence suggests that it is integral to overall and persisting
bioenergetics. The geographic distribution of the multinationals
so organized may be a function not only of raw materials, transportation, and communication, but of labor supplies and costs:
from this perspective, the institutional asymmetry may itself
direct the strategy of expansion. Because in some locations
the multinationals constitute a principal nexus of energy production and control, they are to that extent more powerful than
the potentially competing, but energetically smaller and weaker ,
institutions of the national states in which they find themselves. The latter become, in turn, "company states."
To hazard a very preliminary prediction, any nationalization
of any of the components of the multinational should result in
at least short-run loss of the rationalization that makes it efficient. Any number of recent expropriations might well be
studied from this perspective. The repercussions upon the multinational system as a whole deserve investigation, assuming it
were possible to collect this sort of data. Regardless of long-term
implications, the multinational seems to be phenomenally successful, in evolutionary terms, on the basis of its differential,
competitive expansion. Its differential efficiency in energy production in comparison with other economic and political institutions is responsible for its differential, and increasing, power.

by T. v. SATHYAMU~THY
Department of Politics, University of York, Heslington, York
YOJ 5DD, Engla11d. 22 v 77
This article is presumably intended to be a contribution to an
anthropological approach (i.e., a study using anthropological
concepts, models, and methods) to supranational organizations
and, in particular, multinational corporations. Its claim to be a
theoretical contribution cannot be taken seriously, for it is
little more than a jargonized description of the evolution, structure, and functioning of multinational corporations. It asserts
that these organized expressions of corporate capital are here
to stay and that therefore we should not question their immanance as actors in international relations, but merely record
their status as a historical phenomenon. The author's concern
cannot have been with "structure" in the wider sense in which
it has been handled in anthropological theory over the last 50
years, but only with the internal structure (more accurately,
the working) of these organizations in a mechanical sense.
Nowhere in the article can one glean any awareness on the
part of the author that no characterization of multinational
corporations is possible without focussing on their political and
economic role during a specific phase of the development of
capitalism (see, for example, Horowitz 1969, various issues of
Monthly Review, or, for that matter, the Financial Times, including the statement of G. Agnelli of Fiat on May 21, 1977).
Multinational corporations playa crucial role in the emergence
of a world-embracing capitalist system of production during
the contemporary phase of imperialism. Their penetration of
world markets and their far-flung influence in the chancelleries
of the world-always
to the detriment of the peoples of the
world and always in collusion with the ruling classesof the host
countries, especially those of the Third World-constitute
the
crux of the sharp contradiction between imperial forces attempting to erase national boundaries with the aid of local
collaborators and the popular forces in a number of poor countries, e.g., in Indo-China and southern Africa.
Val.18

No.4.

December 1977

Wolje:

THE

SUl'R,\NATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

OF PRODUCTION

Two points need to be made: (1) It is strange that the author
should find nothing to object to in Wells (1971). (2) The article,
written in 1976, seems to reflect no awareness of the political
role of the ITT-to
cite but one example-in the affairs of Chile
during the Unidad Popular period. Recognition of the international political dynamic of multinational corporations would
have channelled the author's attention to an entirely different
and not trivial problematic relevant to the concrete problems
posed by their existence and the power that they wield. This
article is but one among many that, albeit unwittingly, give
these new multinational agents of local repression in so many
countries a sanitized respectability by turning attention away
from what they do to how "resources in different national economies" are linked "in order to serve a common set of organizational aims."
Those who have viewed the American film Network will recall
the scene in which the television reporter is given a powerful
dose of indoctrination by the chairman of the network. It
achieves its purpose: the transparency of a network chairman
selling a world vie\v that denies the existence of America, ideology, democracy, or anything else except the great multinational
corporations transforms the reporter. We suffer on the academic
scene from no dearth of such reporters, teachers of humanoidswith one difference, however: we do not even appear to need
the services of an ideological exorcist.

by WILLIAM W. STEIN
Department of Anthropology, State University of New York at
Buffalo, 4242 Ridge Lea Rd., Buffalo, N.Y. 14226, U.S.A.
14 VI 77
Had I not been solicited to comment on this paper, I very likely
would have ignored it. After reflection, however, I think that
it should be taken note of, if only to combat its distortions and
omissions. I believe that Wolfe's attempt to show the human
historical trend to\\"ard international organization of production
is a departure in the right direction, and I applaud this, but I
deplore his ahistoricism and the aid he gives to world capitalism
by obscuring the nature of the multinational corporation. In
the capitalistic economic formation, the function of the corporation has to do with the extraction of value from people's labor ,
the accumulation of this value in the form of capital, and the
use of this capital to control and exploit further the producers
of this value-become-capital.
To Wolfe-and to anyone else who believes that "nationality
is not an issue" for the multinational corporation because "the
system as a whole is above the level of the nation-state" and
should be treated ''as a new system at a supranational level of integration" (italics mine)-I would like to recommend an article
by Sweezy and Magdoff (1972:88-112), who dispose of the notiorithit
SOIriethirigriew in the wa:yof international organization has emerged as follows: "in much of the literature this is
used in a propagandistic and apologetic sense, suggesting the
transcendence of national vices and rivalries and the emergence
of a new institution with hopeful auguries for the future. That
such connotations are nonsensical will appear as we proceed
..."
(p. 89). While the multinational corporation is multi-national in that "it operates in a number of nations with the
purpose of maximizing the profits not of the individual units
on a nation-by-nation basis but of the group as a whole. ..in
all other decisive respects we are dealing with national corporations" (p. 90). Ownership and control, with few exceptions, are
not diffused internationally but are concentrated in one nation.
Sweezy and Magdoff (p. 96) point out:
The very idea of a unit of capital divorced from any nationalitywhich, according to some apologetic theories, is what the multinational corporation is in the processof becoming-is a contradiction~
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in terms. Capital is a fundamental part of a particular set of relations
of production which, far from being natural and eternal, is historical
and alterable. These relations of production, implying as they do the
exploitation of some classesand groups by other classesand groups,
were established through violent struggles and can be maintained in
existenceonly through a sufficiently powerful apparatus of coercion,
i.e., a state. Capital without a state is therefore unthinkable. But in
the world as it is constituted today only nations have states: there is
no such thing as a supranational state. It follows that to exist capital
must have nationality.
To illustrate the point, I cite one of the grimmest cases in
modern international political economy, that of the United
States vs. Allende's Chile. The economic blockade of Chile following the latter's expropriation of "multinational"
properties
was organized not supranationally but in one nation-state, the
United States. Similarly, the intervention in Chile's internal
affairs by a campaign of subversion {including the supply of
funds to opponents of the Allende administration, the transmission of false information through mass communications
media, and the organization of fascist street gangs) came from
the United States, not from some hypothetical entity existing
above or beyond that nation-state. This is hardly a "a social
actor. ..\vhich is much less under the actual control of men
than \ve expected it to be." Indeed, the hint that there is something in the existence of the multinational corporation that is
suprahuman, not exactly controlled by men {and, presumably,
\vomen too), mystifies the connections between a social class
and exploitation.
In order to maintain the protection necessary to the retention
of its capital {from the threat of either "primitive" or "civilized"
expropriation), a multinational corporation must have some national force exerted to its benefit. In the case of Chile, there
are two national forces, because Chilean class interests, backed
up by their own enforcers, are also involved. Therefore, it seems
to me that class analysis of the multinational corporation is
more revealing than the application of the "network model,"
the concept of accumulation more clarifying than that of "antiminimization," and imperialism more to the point than "increasing internationalization
of economic activity." The "inadequate categories for dealing with modern production prohlems" are the very ones which are proposed as replacements for
older categories.
I doubt that the multinational corporation will be realistically
viewed outside the framework provided by Lenin's analysis of
imperialism. In order to understand the connection, it is necessary to view the "private resource flow {investment) into developing countries" as only part of a two-way movement of resources, the purpose of which is to transfer wealth from developing {or underdeveloping) countries to developed ones as
multinational investment pays off through profit remittances,
debt-service, royalties, imports, donations, and other transfers
of capital {see Frank 1969:181-91). It seems most inadequate to
me to compare the multinational corporation with bits of e-thnologiC8.lexotica, when ItS existence dOomslarge parts of the
world to poverty, resource depletion, ecological mayhem, and
herds of military enforcers.
by MALCOLMC. WEBB
Department of Anthropology and Geography, University of New
Orleans, New Orleans, La. 70122, U.S.A. 27 VI 77
My comments will be brief, since I find myself in essential agreement with most of what Wolfe says. Although his topic touches
upon the farthest boundaries of what we have traditionally considered appropriate anthropological concerns, this makes his
effort the more praiseworthy. For some decades now, many in
the field have argued that anthropology would not finally come
of age until we habitually applied insights derived from the
simpler societies to the developed industrialized nations and
vice versa. (The writings of Margaret Mead come most readily
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to mind, but I recall my own teacher, the late Leslie White,
making the same point over many years in lectures, and, indeed,
the theme goes back to the time of E. B. Tylor.)
There are, however, two points at which I would like to make
some suggestions for further work. First, insightful as Wolfe's
paper is, it remains a bit programmatic. Allusions to parallels
with the Aranda or Tallensi are fascinating, but what is really
needed is the detailed analysis of organizational nodes or specific cases of decision making in terms of such parallels. (For
a number of years now, I have in my classeson the anthropology
of religion suggested that a fruitful way to understand the social
life and political economy of local churches of the mainstream
Protestant denominations would be to think of them as chiefdoms and subchiefdoms; I must admit, however, that I have
only played with the idea.)
Another area that demands attention is historical antecedents
within the Western cultural tradition. I would not deny that
the recent increase in ~ize and complexity of supranational economic organizations, as well as in the proportion of total enterprise controlled by such entities, does represent something new
-quantitative
increases can in time result in qualitative shifts.
Yet the phenomenon does have analogies, at least, in the past
which might enable us to look at the contemporary scene from
a broader perspective. In late medieval Austria, members of
the Fugger family were not only merchants and bankers, but
also entrepreneurs of mining. The Rothschilds in the 19th century, although more purely devoted to banking, were also much
concerned to establish and extend connections with the state
system of their day. An earlier case might be the trading companies of ancient Mesopotamia, which were frequently hybrids
of private enterprise and state investment; it will be recalled
that some of these even had government-supported links with
the polities of their own "underdeveloped nations" through
trading outposts established in such areas as Anatolia. Ko doubt
persons more familiar with ancient and medieval history than I
could greatly extend and expand upon such examples. Perhaps,
then, one of the most important contributions of Wolfe's paper
will be the stimulation of further research-both
analyses of
contemporary systems and historical-classificatory
studieswhich will provide further support for an idea which, although
intriguing, seems as yet somewhat undeveloped.

by JANE ALISON WEISS and HowARD E. ALDRICH
Department of Sociology, Tulane University, New Orlea,ls, La.
70118; New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, CorneU U1tiversity, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853, U.S.A. 23 VI 77
Wolfe calls for a supranational perspective on the organization
of production and presents a "sociocultural evolutionary approach" (Steward 1955) as the vehicle for defIning this strategy.
There is, of course, something to be said for an idea whose time
has come. A supranational approach to the analysis of international organization is more useful than competing nationstate-based approaches for explaining contemporary modes of
production and exchange, and this paradigmatic approach has
been articulated by others in sociology, economics, and history.
Despite Wolfe's assertions to the contrary, theorists across disciplines are attempting to describe the increasingly complex
interactions among units at the world level: notably, Wallerstein
(1972a, b, 1974), Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns (1976),
Johnson (1970), and Frank (1966).
There are three questions which a theory of supranational
organization must answer if it is to have explanatory power:
(1) What are th~ components of the supranational network?
(2) What is the nature of the linkages binding the components
into a network? (3) What are the causal processes which brought
the network into existence and which link its components at
any given historical point? Wolfe fully answers only the first
of these questions, arguing that the components of the emergent
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network are states, corporations, persons, and institutions joined
by a plexus of ties which are interlocking and predominantly
nonhierarchical in form. He claims to follo\v Ste\vard's evolutionary perspective, but does not present a clear theoretical
model. Instead, the article is comprised of a series of empirical
generalizations on the emergence of forms, focused primarily on
the multinational corporation as a new form. The lack of a
clear causal argument leaves readers with the impression that
the supranational system is a result of the unfolding of change
immanent in corporations "invented centuries ago" and states
"invented a few thousand years ago."
If Wolfe wishes to discuss a supranational system as a system, then he must confront the question of the processes which
sustain it. A consideration of three processes points up the limits
of Wolfe's implicit answers to the three questions we have posed.
First, the emergent supranational system may be a result of
traditional market mechanisms, extended to include an international division of labor. Perhaps the preeminent critic of the
ontogenetic approach to the study of social formations is Immanuel Wallerstein; he has asserted repeatedly that the only
meaningful social unit in the capitalist world is the world economy. His argument is based on the emergence of an international
division of labor and the concomitant disjunction between political and economic institutions in the "long" 16th century, with
the territorially limited nation-state confronting territorially expansive regional (and then world) production and exchange
systems. From this perspective, multinational corporations are
simply a part of the extension of capital to a world division of
labor. Wallerstein has already identified the "distinctive segments" of the supranational economic system that Wolfe refers
to, labelling them the core, periphery , and semiperiphery states.
Wallerstein, unlike Wolfe, sees this world economic system as
the precursor of a world socialist state, which \,-ill be a truly
supranational system. In work anticipating
Wallerstein's
schema, Lenski (1966, 1970) argued that an increase in the
size and complexity of a society's economic system, based on
technological advances, is followed by a similar expansion in
its political organization. Historically, this process has resulted
in the emergence of ever-expanding political-economic units, beginning with hunting and gathering bands and continuing up
to the nation-state as the current unit, p~rhaps to be superseded
by multinational units such as the European Economic Community. Lenski's is very much a materialist view of history and
could be used to describe the components of the contemporary
world level organization of production, specify the processes
generating the system, and estimate the potential for the
emergence of a new social formation isomorphic with the expanded productive base.
Second, a supranational system may be maintained by dependence relations among its major components: states and
corporations. In a world marked by gross inequalities among
nations and corporations, it is simply implausible that a system
will emerge which is nonhierarchical at the top. It is, perhaps, a
misplaced emphasis on multinational corporations and the lack
of a specifically historical or causal argument which leads Wolfe
to the assertion that we are witnessing the evolution of new
organizational forms, abstract in nature and not necessarily
based on any previously existing ones. The degree of interdependence among units portrayed by Wolfe in the last few
paragraphs of his article would be extremely destabilizing in a
nonhierarchical system. As Simon (1962) has argued, the survival of large and complex systems is critically dependent upon
their being hierarchical and loosely coupled. Frank (1966),
Baumgartner and Burns (1975), and Galtung (1971) have
pointed out that the world system is held together not by a
mutual-influence structure, but by relations of dominance and
subordination among nations and corporations. It is easy to
be seduced by the word "multinational."
However, it is clear
that most corporations are multinational only in their opera-
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tions; their ownership is strictly limited to a handful of the
core states.
Finally, the most obvious sources of transnational integration
and the most recent developments on the international scene
are the supranational agencies and organizations, public and
private, that are oriented explicitly to\vard world or multinational goals. It is curious that, in a paper dealing with
multinational business corporations, VII'olfe does not cite the
agencies most concerned with providing the infrastructure for
worldwide economic transactions: the International Monetary
Fund, oriented toward stabilizing currency values, the World
Bank, concerned with investment in developing nations, the
International Labor Organization, disseminating information
about industrial relations and collective bargaining structures,
and a host of agencies and committees of the United Nations
that monitor and attempt to influence all aspects of international development. Tlie European Economic Community (the
"Common Market") in Western Europe and Comecon in Eastern Europe are political-economic transnational units oriented
toward some degree of regional economic integration. Other organizations and groups are explicitly concerned with world order
and military security: NATO performs the same function for
Western European nations that the Warsaw Pact performs for
Eastern European nations, and other organizations such as the
Organization of African States attempt to instill coherence into
the external political affairs of member nations. Whether these
organizations and agencies are successful is not crucial to our
point-they
are supranational actors explicitly concerned not
just with "sociocultural" activities but with a political economy
of "real relations" (Marx 1973:90).
Wolfe's major point is well taken-production
is evolving on
a world scale, and social scientists should adopt a theoretical
perspective consonant with the emergent structure. We doubt,
however, that a nonmaterialist sociocultural approach is powerful enough to do the job.

Reply
by ALVIN w. WOLFE
Tampa, Fla., U.S.A. 19 VII 77
Two misunderstandings shared by many of the commentators
should be cleared up at the outset. My article is about the development of a supranational system encompassing multinational corporations and states, not about the multinational corporation as an institution in its own right. Secondly, my article
is in no way intended as a defense of neocolonial exploitation, or
of the status quo, whatever it is.
I should have thought that I had emphasized sufficiently that
my concern is with the system as a whole-"a
modern supranational structure that is more than just international," "a cultural-ecological system that is above the level of the nationstate and above the level of the multinational firm and even
the multinational enterprise as Vernon defines it." Again and
again, I make the point that "the system of our concern is different from an international organization and different from a
cartel formed by corporations," that it is "a qualitatively distinctive sociocultural system at a higher level of integration,"
that it is "a social system involving states, corporations, and
networks of corporations and states and persons, systematically
processing information in such a way that the higher-order
system exerts significant control over the elements organized
at lower levels of integration." In the light of all this, it is hard
for me to understand why at least nine of the commentators
react as if the subject of the article were the multinational cor631

poration per se. Insofar as they misjudge the very subject of the
title, the supranational organization of production, commentators Klein, Magubane, Nash, Ke\vell, O'Brien, Price, Sathyamurthy, Stein, and Weiss and Aldrich are likely to miss the
mark.
The other misunderstanding, the view that the paper is a
defense of multinationals and of their exploitation of the peoples
of the world, is more understandable, in retrospect, because I
did not exert the same effort to make clear my sensitivity to
the fact of exploitation of the poor as I did to make clear that the
subject of the paper is a supranational system at a hierarchical
level many times removed from the level at which most individuals and households operate. I do, in fact, believe that both
states and corporations (whether multinational or not) are exploiting peoples ruthlessly in every part of the \vorld. However ,
before we can know whether kno\vledge of the supranational
system can be used to combat such exploitation \ve must develop
that knowledge. There are those, represented by Klein, Magubane, O'Brien, Sathyamurthy, Stein, and Weiss and Aldrich,
who believe that Marxist scholarship tells us all we need to
know about such things, and they seem particularly unhappy
with my saying I have been unable to find a Marxist work which
treats the supranational system as anything more than an imperialistic continuation of the growth of nationally based
monopoly capitalism. These commentators have given me some
new references, most of which I have checked into, but they
have not shown me any greater understanding of that which I
take as problematic, the evolution of a system at a level of integration above that of states. Of course, Marx and many others
since speak of the world market or the world system, but they
do not clarify the processes of development of a supranational
system. It was not my intention to write in opposition to Marxist theoretical approaches, or in opposition to any of the other
theoretical approaches mentioned. However, from my reading
of their treatment of the current activity in the area of organization of production above the level of nation-states, I believe
that Marxist scholars, like those from other disciplines, are so
firmly wedded to their given concepts that they cannot conceive
of the generation of something genuinely new, such as this wider
system that subsumes not only states and corporations but all
other subsystems as well. That is why I believe scholars with
a broad evolutionary anthropological perspective must address
these problems, for such scholars-anthropologists
broadly
trained-::are likely to be open-minded enough to recognize new
formations when they are generated out of the interactions of
those institutions we already know. It doesn't take much vision
or theoretical insight to see how states and corporations interact
in going about their deliberate purposes of good or evil. To see
the patterns of new institutional forms above these, however,
requires the same kind of relativistic method and holistic perspective that anthropologists have traditionally applied in coming to understand unfamiliar cultural systems everywhere. The
anthropologist who becomes a true believer committed to a
given set of concepts and processes will surely miss an opportunity to discover something newly developing.
I know it will not satisfy Magubane's call for "revolutionary
action" and for "relating [phenomena of multinational enterprise] critically and in a revolutionary fashion to the growth of
monopoly capitalism," but he and some others might be interested to know that during the 1960s I published a number of
papers on neocolonialism in Africa (1962a, b, 1964, 1965, 1966a,
b, 1967; Onwuachi and Wolfe 1966) in "praxis-oriented" publications such as Liberation, Toward Freedom, p ASOA N ewsletter,
and Africa Today. Some of my writings were introduced into
United Nations proceedings at various levels, and they earned
me the hostility of important "capitalists" such as Clarence
Randall, President Eisenhower's foreign economic advisor and
President Kennedy's negotiator for the Ghana Volta River dam
project. I was intrigued, as was the chancellor of my university
when a member of the board of regents called it to his attention,
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to see myself referred to in the N ew Yark Ti1ltcS (April 4, 1963)
as a member of "a highly articulate two-man team" charging
"that Africa is 'being looted' by a 'Cape-to-Katanga team' of
malefactors of great wealth." Randall went on to say that this
team-myself
and the Reverend Michael Scott-using
every
available means, endeavored to whip up animosity against the
great mining corporations and against private corporate operation of mining enterprises. "Professor Wolfe does the writing,
Reverend Scott distributes the materials to the delegates, and
appears before the committees," he said. For whatever it is
worth, I have been attacked at least as vehemently by "monopoly capitalists" as I am now by "Maoist-Marxists."
By the
way, as I was rummaging through old papers to find Clarence
Randall's wording, I came across a letter from Julian Steward,
dated December 4, 1962. Since Magubane, at least, feels that
I have "oversimplified and misapplied Steward's theory of
sociocultural evolution," perhaps readers would be interested
in Steward's comment on one of my early manuscripts on this
subject: "I am more gratified than I can tell you that my concepts have found such incisive application and brilliant illustration in the paper that you so kindly sent me. ...You
not
only express the concept [level of integration] very correctly,
but you go some\,hat beyond what I have written and relate
the concept to evolution in what seems a very crucial way ."
Now, to address some specific points mentioned by commentators: I must apologize to Belshaw for failing to recognize that
he, also, sees that state systems and national and international
organizations are pqor models for new institutions to supersede
the present ones. Apparently this is a level of discussion where
it is difficult to communicate what we mean. Because of this
difficulty, I deliberately use the term supranational, rather than
international or multinational, when I refer to the system which
is qualitatively distinct from the national or international or
multinational institutions.
Dow questions whether we are justified in identifying the
supranational system as at a new level of integration because,
in his words, "the multinational enterprise" does not have many
characteristics that one associates with whole cultures. First, as
I explained earlier, I do not say that a multinational enterprise
(as defined by Vernon) is in itself a supranational system. A
multinational enterprise is involved with many other multinational enterprises and states, etc., in an emerging system which
is at a supranational level. Even so, Dow might argue that that
overarching system is not an integrated, whole culture-one
that meets all human basic and derived needs or one whose
institutions satisfy all the requisites of a society. Again, however, I must insist that in the Stewardian evolutionary framework many levels of integration coexist in a complex social system: simple forms become gradually modified as specialized dependent parts of new kinds of total configurations. The institutions that operate primarily at the topmost level-integrating,
constraining, influencing the subsystems immediately below-never by themselves represent a11ything like a total culture.
State institutions are not complete in themselves, yet it is often
said of a given society or culture that it is organized at a state
level of integration. All I say is that the evidence of systematization of the relations among multinational corporations, states,
and other institutions can be interpreted as the generation of
a new system at a still higher level.
I am disappointed that no commentator other than Geschiere refers to the problem of di,fierent economic spheres or
spheres of transactions, which I take to be rather important as
an essentially anthropological contribution.
I can see why
Geschiere is surprised that I cite Barth in this regard, for Barth
lays emphasis on maximization as the general underlying principle while I call particular attention to the fact of various principles (motives, decision rules) operating in diverse spheres.
Barthjs emphasis on maximization notwithstanding,
he does
contribute to the general literature on economic spheres, although he defines them differently than do Bohannan and DalCURRENT
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poration per sc. Insofar as they misjudge the very subject of the
title, the supranational organization of production, commentators Klein, Magubane, Nash, lI.'e\vell, O'Brien, Price, Sathyamurthy, Stein, and Weiss and Aldrich are likely to miss the
mark.
The other misunderstanding, the view that the paper is a
defense of multinationals and of their exploitation of the peoples
of the world, is more understandable, in retrospect, because I
did not exert the same effort to make clear my sensitivity to
the fact of exploitation of the poor as I did to make clear that the
subject of the paper is a supranational system at a hierarchical
level many times removed from the level at which most individuals and households operate. I do, in fact, believe that both
states and corporations (whether multinational or not) are exploiting peoples ruthlessly in every part of the \vorld. However ,
before we can know \vhether kno\vledge of the supranational
system can be used to combat such exploitation \ve must develop
that knowledge. There are those, represented by Klein, Magubane, O'Brien, Sathyamurthy, Stein, and Weiss and Aldrich,
who believe that Marxist scholarship tells us all we need to
know about such things, and they seem particularly unhappy
with my saying I have been unable to find a Marxist work which
treats the supranational system as anything more than an imperialistic continuation of the growth of nationally based
monopoly capitalism. These commentators have given me some
new references, most of which I have checked into, but they
have not shown me any greater understanding of that which I
take as problematic, the evolution of a system at a level of integration above that of states. Of course, Marx and many others
since speak of the world market or the world system, but they
do not clarify the processes of development of a supranational
system. It was not my intention to write in opposition to Marxist theoretical approaches, or in opposition to any of the other
theoretical approaches mentioned. However, from my reading
of their treatment of the current activity in the area of organization of production above the level of nation-states, I believe
that Marxist scholars, like those from other disciplines, are so
firmly wedded to their given concepts that they cannot conceive
of the generation of something genuinely new, such as this wider
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broadly
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formations when they are generated out of the interactions of
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or theoretical insight to see how states and corporations interact
in going about their deliberate purposes of good or evil. To see
the patterns of new institutional forms above these, however ,
requires the same kind of relativistic method and holistic perspective that anthropologists have traditionally applied in coming to understand unfamiliar cultural systems everywhere. The
anthropologist who becomes a true believer committed to a
given set of concepts and processes will surely miss an opportunity to discover something newly developing.
I know it will not satisfy Magubane's call for "revolutionary
action" and for "relating [phenomena of multinational enterprise] critically and in a revolutionary fashion to the growth of
monopoly capitalism," but he and some others might be interested to know that during the 1960s I published a number of
papers on neocolonialism in Africa (1962a, b, 1964, 1965, 1966a,
b, 1967; Onwuachi and Wolfe 1966) in "praxis-oriented" publications such as Liberation, Toward Freedom, p ASOA N ewsletter,
and Africa Today. Some of my writings were introduced into
United Nations proceedings at various levels, and they earned
me the hostility of important "capitalists" such as Clarence
Randall, President Eisenhower's foreign economic advisor and
President Kennedy's negotiator for the Ghana Volta River dam
project. I was intrigued, as was the chancellor of my university
when a member of the board of regents called it to his attention,
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institutions satisfy all the requisites of a society. Again, however, I must insist that in the Stewardian evolutionary framework many levels of integration coexist in a complex social system: simple forms become gradually modified as specialized dependent parts of new kinds of total configurations. The institutions that operate primarily at the topmost level-integrating,
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said of a given society or culture that it is organized at a state
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I am disappointed that no commentator other than Geschiere refers to the problem of d~erent economic spheres or
spheres of transactions, which I take to be rather important as
an essentially anthropological contribution. I can see why
Geschiere is surprised that I cite Barth in this regard, for Barth
lays emphasis on maximization as the general underlying principle while I call particular attention to the fact of various principles (motives, decision rules) operating in diverse spheres.
Barthjs emphasis on maximization notwithstanding,
he does
contribute to the general literature on economic spheres, although he defines them differently than do Bohannan and DalCURRENT
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ton. Unfortunately, even Bohannan and Dalton (1962) confuse
readers by defining spheres as being distinct, separate, and inpendent and then going on to speak of how transactions within
a sphere may be called conveyances while transactions between
spheres may be called conversions (p. 5). Thus, when Geschiere
says that "fundamental to the distinction of such spheres is
that values in one sphere can only with great difficulty be
transformed into values in the other sphere(s),"he is not necessarily presenting the only view possible. My own preference is
to conceive of spheres as identifiable by one or more of several
criteria: (a) by type of resource involved, as when some goods
tend to be valued only in terms of others in the same sphere;
(b) by type of actor involved, as when some actors tend to deal
only with certain others; or (c) by type of principle or decision
rule involved, as when "giving" anything tends to be thought
of as in a separate sphere from "selling" anything. Using definitions such as these, and reasonable probabilistic thresholds for
handling transactions between spheres, I think we will make
more sense out of our modern spheres than do economists who
insist on a unicentric universal economy in which all transactions are governed by the market mode and any behavior that
is not interpretable as in that mode is simply ruled out as "noneconomic." This is \vhy I cite with approval the works of Boulding and his colleagues on the "grants economy ," those of Boeke,
Furnivall, and Averitt on dual economies, whether colonial or
"internal," and that of Piore on the dual labor market within
the United States. Theyall adopt \Vhat I see as an open anthropological attitude.
Nash takes me to task largely for saying that the supranational system seems to me to have a structure more like the tribal
structure of the Aranda of Australia or of the Tallensi of Ghana
than like anything previously described in the Western tradition. I am not referring here to any specific model such as that
of the segmentary lineage system, which she cites, but rather to
the facts that there are crosscutting ties and cleavages and that
there is no centralized government. Nonetheless, Nash goes on
to say that I fail to see the contradictions between this (supranational) model and that of the segmentary lineage. As a matter
of fact, I (1961) have studied the Xgombe, in what is now Zaire,
whose social system is (was) a rather perfect example of a segmentary lineage system, more perfect than the Nuer or the Tiv,
and though I did not comment on these in my paper, I do see
quite a few analogs there. There is in the segmentary lineage
system of the Ngombe almost the same commitment to perpetual growth (through births) that there is in the supranational
system (through reinvested profits). Nash says the segmentary
lineage is inherently limited in its growth, and the process of
hiving off is a manifestation of these limits. Does she not recall
Sahlins's (1961) article on the segmentary lineage as a mechanism of predatory expansion? Further, she says the emergent
international system lacks the central feature of segmentary
clan structure-a
moral/ideological system binding the segments together and enabling new, autonomous units to develop
without cultivating a sense of competition. From practical experience with the Ngombe, and from reading about the Nuer
and the Tiv, I know that at the topmost level of the segmentary
lineag~, where the scale is widest, the moral/ideological bonds
are fragile indeed, and at every level of segmentation below
that there is intense competition, rivalry, and often physical
combat. An important point of the analogy is that despite such
competition the units involved engage in a great deal of organized cooperative activity evenwithout centralized government.
This is true of traditional African societies with segmentary
lineage systems, and it is true of these modern systems operating above the level of nation-states. Believe me, those who operate at the supranational level share a world view that differs
from that of most of the rest of humanity!
Belshaw and Webb are correct to call attention to commercial
operations extending over large geopolitical areas in the mediaeval past as possible precedents for some of today's developVol.18

.No.4.

December 1977

rroljc:

THE

SUPRANATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

OF

PRODUCTION

ments. Unquestionably, there have been tenuous moves toward
organization at such levels before no\v. Until now, however,
these have not, I think, produced sufficient regularity to warrant
identification as a system at the new level of integration. As I
say in the article, the evolutionary generative process by which
a ne\v system at a hierarchically superior level comes into
existence involves previously existing units and subunits
changing their relations with one another and changing their
internal structure gradually until, at some point, all the
internal and external relations are different enough that the
new interdependency is recognized as a system at a higher level
of integration. There may be, to be sure, a lot of activity over a
long period without systemic change; then, suddenly, a coalescence triggered by some concomitant factors produces the new
system. One of the factors triggering the coalescence of a system at the supranational level now is certainly the capability
for instantaneous worldwide communication and the processing
of myriad bits of information that previously would have taken
months or could not have been done at all. All human systems
then were more territorially
bounded, whether in mediaeval
times or in the 19th century when Europeans used "corporations" to express their hegemony in Mrica. The data-processing
revolution since 1952-not only in electronic hardware but also
in mathematical programming software-provides
a quite different ecological setting for the evolutionary tendencies toward
supranational organization of production. It is a different world
from that of the Roman Empire, different from that of mediaeval Europe, and, incidentally, different from the industrializing
world known to Marx.
To this point also, Steward's 1962 letter to me is highly relevant, for after saying that I had not only expressed the concept
of levels of integration correctly and had taken it beyond what
he had "Tit ten in relating it to evolution in a crucial way, he
continued:
That is, you connect emergent and qualitatively new forms to qualitatively new processes.It is at this point, I think, that one of the most
basic differencesbetween White, as an evolutionist, and many other
social scientists, who seekuniversalistic processes,becomescrucial. It
is also at this point that any so-caIled applied anthropology may be
important today in focusing attention through an empirical method
on the fact that something unknown in the past is happening.
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